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1 INTRODUCTION   
Family responsibility (FR) is an ideological social construct that relates to functions and roles 
that individuals play in a family.  The interpretation of the concept may be influenced by cultural 
differentiation, particularly relating to role categorisation among family members.  Whereas 
family responsibility leave (FRL) is a workplace entitlement in South Africa, provided for in the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act1 (the BCEA), time and time again employees find 
themselves differentiated against and having to justify their rights and entitlement to such leave 
to their employers, to fulfil family roles.In most cases these rights differ from the employers’ 
policies resulting in workplace conflict.  This is especially observable when employees 
belonging to ‘extended families’, and perceiving relatives in their families as equally important 
family members expect a ‘fitting’ treatment from their employer.  For example, the only two 
cases which dealt with the concept family responsibility in the African context was that of Public 
Servants Association on behalf of Jonase2 and Fairy Tales Boutique t/a Baby City 
Centurion3where employees alleged that their brother-in-law and mother-in-law’s 
funeralsrespectively constituted a family responsibility. In both instances employers found that 
the in laws did not fall within the category of family and refused to grant the employees the 
requested family responsibility leave.  
 
Fitting treatment implies that FRL should be granted where familial assistance is required by any 
of the members of such family.  On the contrary some employers rely on the list of family 
members provided by the BCEA4  and refuse to grant FRL outside the scope of the Act. 
Therefore, Bulpitt5 finds it difficult “explaining to emotionally distressed employees why FRL 
cannot be granted” because some employers simply place reliance on the provision of the BCEA 
                                                          
1 Act 75 of 1997, Chapter three Section 19 to 27. 
2Public Servants Association on behalf of Jonase and Department of Justice & Constitutional Development(2011) 
32 ILJ 1271 (BCA). 
3Fairy Tales Boutique t/a Baby City Centurion v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and 
others(JR469/09) [2010] ZALC 160 (20 August 2010). 
4 Section 27 of the BCEA. 
5A Bulpitt www.synocunsulting.co.za/index/article/aid/=4:family-responsibility-leave accessed 16 November2013 
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to decline such leave requests. Such a treatment, which may be in conflict with cultural and/or 
customary practices, is viewed by affected employees as prejudicial treatment amounting to 
discrimination on the basis of their culture and concept of family.     
 
Meanwhile, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19966 (“the Constitution”), 
guarantees amongst other rights; the right to equality7, the right to fair labour practices8 and the 
right to cultural practices9.This is in line with South Africa’s obligations as a member state to the 
United Nations and in recognition of the International Bill of Rights.10Subsequent to the 
Constitution, the BCEA and the Employment Equity Act11 (the EEA), were passed as 
subordinate legislation to give effect to the Constitution.  Thesepieces of legislation promote and 
enforce the right to fair labour practices and focus on issues of discrimination respectively.12  
Both Acts comply with the Republic’s obligations as a member of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO).13 
 
The BCEA14 prescribes basic conditions of employment that regulates the workplace, setting out 
conditions of employment for all employees with the exception of those employees specifically 
excluded by the Act.15 These basic conditions exclude employees whose conditions of 
employment areregulated through their employment contracts, collective agreements and other 
legislation. For those employees falling within the ambit of the BCEA, it sets out their 
employment policies and procedures which employers rely on. One of the conditions set out in 
the BCEA is a provision for leave, which includes amongst others family responsibility leave.16  
In providing for family responsibility leave, the BCEA qualifies family members that are the 
                                                          
6Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
8 Section 23 of the Constitution. 
9Section 31 of the Constitution. 
10Articles 7, 16, 23 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
11The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
12Preamble of the BCEA and Section 2 of the BCEA read with the Preamble to the EEA. 
13Forced Labour Convention, 1930(No. 29); Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (N0. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) Article 1, 2, 3 and 4; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111) Article 1, 2 and 5; Workers with Family Responsibility and Recommendation No. 
165Convention, 1981 (No. 156).  
14 Act 75 of 1997. 
15Section 3 of the BCEA. 
16Section 27 of the BCEA. 
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responsibility of an employee and for whom leave may be used. In terms of the section dealing 
with FRL, family responsibility leave may be granted in instances where members of a family 
require familial assistance. The classification allowed from the BCEA restricts the application to 
a nuclear family. Notably, the BCEA does not define family responsibility nor does it provide a 
definition for family and this must be inferred. 
 
The EEA17 on the other hand complements the Constitution in eliminating unfair discrimination 
and achieving a diverse workforce. Discrimination on any of the grounds listed in the 
Constitution18 and those in the EEA19 is unfair unless proven otherwise.  The EEA prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of family responsibility. 
 
Despite the stated provisions, employees still encounter difficulties in their workplaces. The 
encounter is common among African employees who belong to the indigenous communities in 
South Africa.  The employees experience challenges and limitations when seeking to uphold 
family values and practice their culture. For example, restrictions are encountered when applying 
for family responsibility leave as a consequence of limitations in the categorisation of instances 
determining the awarding of such leave.  Employees feel frustrated by failure to provide 
assistance or to even bury their ‘loved ones’ in some cases, who according to their cultural 
practices and family values are classified as members of their families.20 
 
The limitations in the categorisation of instances when FRL may be granted seem to be 
influenced by the different cultural description of the structure of a family which may be 
interpreted through sociological or anthropological ideologies. Therefore problems arise because 
of different impressions of family structures in South Africa as a result of the different races and 
cultures in the country.21 On the one hand, the Western definition of family is said to originate 
                                                          
17 Act 55 of 1998. 
18 Section 9(3) of the Constitution lists the prohibited grounds. 
19 Section 6 (1) of the EEAlists the prohibited grounds. 
20This was the case in Jonase (note 2 above) and Fairy Tales Boutique (Note 3 above). 
21Guide to the 2014 South African Election, welections.wordpress.com 
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from the “traditional nuclear family”22 and on the other, the African understanding, which 
encompasses more categories of people and is classified as “extended family”.23 
 
The problem is seemingly common in countries with indigenous communities, in which the 
Western definition or classification does not represent the culture of the locals. Morphy refers to 
households as a prevalent feature for indigenous communities in Australia and argues the 
incommensurability of the nuclear definition and the definition of household in the indigenous 
sense.  According to Morphy, households, “are often spread across more than one dwelling”, 
with “everyone related to everyone else”.24  This is said to “conflate the ‘family’ with the usual 
residents of the dwelling.”25 
 
Although the discretion to grant leave rests with the employer,26 solutions have to be found that 
enable informed decisions to avoid conflicts.  This study investigates how the African family 
structure in South Africa is affected in the granting of FRL and establishes whether the awarding 
of leave without considering cultural differences constitute discrimination.  This is done by 
establishing how the family structure provided by the BCEA conforms to African cultural 
practices in South Africa and whether or not the application of the provision does differentiate 
between employees.   
 
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Section 27(2) of the BCEA sets out employees’ entitlement to family responsibility leave and 
circumstances under which the leave may be granted. The provision limits the definition of 
family to a nuclear family, thereby excluding other broader and cultural definitions and deprives 
African people of their entitlement. Although employers possess the discretion of awarding or 
not awarding leave related to family responsibility/compassion, choices to do so are not only 
                                                          
22D Popenoe ‘American Family Decline, 1960 – 1990: A review and Appraisal’ (1993) 55 Journal of Marriage and 
Family (1993) 527-555 and F Morphy ‘Lost in Translation? Remote Indigenous households and definitions of the 
family’ (2006) 73 Family Matters23-31. 
23SV Nzimande ‘Family Structure and Support Systems in Black Communities’ in AF Steyn, Strijdon HG, Viljoen S 
and Bosman FJ (eds) ‘Marriage & Family Life in South Africa: Research Priorities’ (1987) Pretoria: Human 
Science Research Council. 
24Morphy (note 22above) 28. 
25Ibid 31. 
26 My Wage http://www.mywage.co.za/main/decent-work/family-responsibilities 
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influenced by productivity consequences of the employee’s absence as some courts and tribunals 
may conclude but may also be indicative of compliance tendencies of other employers.    That is, 
some employers may be misled by section 27(2) to waive their discretion.  In contrast to this, the 
EEA provides a wide definition of family responsibility which is all encompassing. It is 
noteworthy to say that the BCEA was enacted prior to the EEA. This may explain the different 
definitions and the fact that the latter is more accommodating. A further factor may be because 
the EEA was passed specifically to address discrimination issues in the workplace. On the face 
of it, the definition in the BCEA appears to be violating the rights of Black employees. 
 
3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Does the awarding of family responsibility leave as provided for in South African 
policies/legislation discriminate against cultural practices of Black/African employees?  
 
3.1 Research sub-questions 
3.1.1 Does the definition of family responsibility leave discriminate against the cultural notion 
of family responsibility of Black/African employees? 
31.1.1 What is the definition of family and its consequent responsibilities in 
African/Black Culture? 
3.1.1.2 What is the legal definition of family responsibility leave?  
3.1.1.3 Does the legal definition of family responsibility leave include or exclude the 
cultural definition of family responsibility for Black/African employees?   
3.1.1.4 How does the Constitution protect the rights of Black/African Employees to 
family and fair labour practices?  
3.1.1.5 Is the awarding of family responsibility leave as provided for in legislation  
  compliant with the constitutional rights of Black/African employees? 
3.1.1.6 Does the legal definition of family responsibility leave amount to unfair 
discrimination on the basis of family status? 
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3.1.2.  How have the courts interpreted the cultural family responsibility leave of Black/African 
Employees? 
3.1.2.1 How have the South African courts interpreted cases relating to the awarding of 
family responsibility leave? 
3.1.2.2 Is the courts’ approach compliant with the Constitution? 
3.1.3. If the South African legal position falls foul of the Constitution and the state’s 
international law obligations towards the recognition of the cultural family responsibility 
of Black/African employees how can this be rectified? 
 
4 THE RATIONALE 
 
Whilst some literature has considered the situation of women (and men) in the workplace with 
regard to specifically child care as family responsibility,27 there is no academic opinion in South 
Africa on the parameters of family responsibility in relation to extended family members of 
African employees.  Yet, there appears to be a problem in awarding family responsibility leave 
with respect to African cultural practices. Whilst equalising the care responsibilities of the sexes 
has made some strides,28 recognition of diverse family forms and care responsibilities have not 
featured but for an isolated case.29 Frustrations encountered by African employees when 
employers decline their applications for FRL result in accusations of unfairness and cause 
                                                          
27Dancaster L and Cohen T ‘Workers with family responsibilities: a comparative analysis to advocate for the legal 
right to request flexible working arrangements in South Africa’ (2010) 34(1) South African Journal of Labour 
Relations 31-45;  Cohen T and Dancaster L ‘Family responsibility discrimination litigation – a non-starter?’ (2009) 
20(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 221-240; Dancaster Land Baird M‘Workers with care responsibilities: is work-
family integration adequately addressed in South African labour law?’(2008) 29 ILJ 22. 
28 K Padayachee ‘Labour Court backs Family Responsibility’ IOL News13 June 
2012http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/labour-court-backs-family-responsibility-1.1317812 (regarding the 
case of Hugo v eThekwini Municipality and Others settled in favour of flexible working arrangements for an 
employee, the mother of an autistic child); Holness W ‘Family Responsibility in the Workplace’ 
http://realisingrights.wordpress.com/2012/10/18/family-responsibility-in-the-workplace/See further: Brand H and 
Barreiro-Lucas J ‘Return-to-work experiences of female employees following maternity leave’ (2014) 38(1) South 
African Journal of Labour Relations 69-92; Field, CG, Bagraim JJ and Rycroft A ‘Parental leave rights: have fathers 
been forgotten and does it matter?’ 2012 36(2) South African Journal of Labour Relations 30-41. 
29Jonase (note 2 above). 
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workplace strain between employers and their employees.30The employees, who feel that their 
rights are being desecrated and their families values compromised equate the refusal of FRL to 
an act of discrimination on the grounds of their culture.  Employers on the other hand are led by 
legislation, which they rely on to avoidconflict, but end up with court judgments that are contrary 
to what was promulgated by the guiding document, the BCEA.  
 
There are indications that some employers, if they use discretion, do so with limited 
understanding of what family means in some cultures. A study that reveals difficulties 
encountered by African employees when seeking to exercise their leave entitlement and which 
also highlights causes of such problems is pertinent to the situation.  The examination of African 
cultural practices and values and the meaning of family within the African communities together 
with resulting responsibilities will contribute to better understanding of their expectations when 
they request for FRL. 
 
Information on the legal definition and the provision of family responsibility leave as provided 
by law and policies including implications thereof are equally important. The purpose for the 
study is to explore the existence of discriminatory practices in the awarding of family 
responsibility leave and to establish if this is as a result of legislative/policy documents and if so, 
to recommend best practices. 
 
The study is significant in that employers seek information on when and how to show 
“sensitivity and understanding of the cultural practices of employees”.31  The Fairy Tales 
Boutique judgment32, cited by Jordaan, reveals consequences of insensitivity.  Jordaan alerts that 
the implications of requests for FRL related to culture may be so serious that considerations may 
even have to be made when FRL days are exhausted.33 
 
Although the structural classification is important to this study, the basis for the South African 
inclination towards the Eurocentric (or Western) definition of family structure in this regard is 
                                                          
30Jonase (note 2 above) and Fairy Tales Boutique (note 3 above). 
31B Jordaan ‘Accommodating Cultural Beliefs and Indigenous Customs’.http://www.hrworks.co.za/articles/69-
accommodating-cultural-beliefs-and-indigenous-customs accessed on 12 November 2013 
32Fairy Tales Boutique (note 3 above). 
33Jordaan (note 31 above). 
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not established in this study. It is hoped that the study will influence contracts and policies 
regulating leave of those excluded by the BCEA take culture into consideration that results of 
this study will influence those responsible for such contracts and policies also. 
 
5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is a qualitative inquiry of non-interactive nature.  It establishes the understanding of 
the concept ‘family’ in the labour market (workplaces) and in the African culture and determines 
to what extent there are similarities and differences between the two definitions.  The study 
explores the effects of any differences in line with the legislation regulating the rights of 
employees as well as responsibilities of employers in the application of and the awarding of 
family responsibility leave. 
 
The research studies a case of the South African FRL by utilising non-empirical desktop 
research.  This is done this by reviewing various legislative documents, especially those that 
protect the right to fair labour practice, prohibit discrimination and regulate the workplace, in 
order to create knowledge in the workplace dealing with instances relating to the provision of 
FRL.  The study also establishes the African definition and understanding of ‘family’ and makes 
a comparison between the two levels of understanding. The study then explores activities relating 
to FRL as defined by the law in workplaces and how this affects or is affected by culture of the 
African employees.   
 
The design of the study comprises two aspects of the study of family, the cultural and then 
legislative definitions. These are followed by the recommendations for a non-discriminatory 
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     Suggested solutions 
 
Figure 1. A framework of the study design 
 
6 CHAPTER OUTLINE AND BREAK-DOWN 
The remaining chapters in this study are as follows: 
6.1 Chapter 2 The cultural definition of family responsibility leave 
This chapter considers the definition of family as the starting point to defining the consequent 
family responsibility. It starts by considering the international definition and then deals with the 
South African definition. Included in the definition are the responsibilities arising from the two 
cultures.  
 
6.2 Chapter 3 The legal definition of family responsibility leave 
 
The legal definition of family is considered taking into account the international instruments 
ratified by South Africa, the regional commitments and then available national legislation. 
Relevant employment law statutes are then analysed with the Constitution of South Africa as the 
guiding document. 
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6.3 Chapter 4 Discrimination and Culture Practices 
An understanding of these concepts will further assist in determining the existence of 
discrimination and other rights conferred by the Constitution relevant to the study.  
 
6.4 Chapter 5 Interpretation of family responsibility leaveby South African courts 
Having dealt with the definitions and relevant South African legislation, a review of cases will be 
considered to establish how the Courts have interpreted and applied the concept. 
 
6.5 Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter 6 analyses the legal interpretation embodied in several pieces of legislation andis 
intended to reveal whether there are discriminatory tendencies in the awarding of FRL. In order 
to answer this question, this will require a review of South African Constitution and the 
Employment Equity Act which deal with and prohibit unfair discrimination in the workplace. An 
understanding of discrimination supports the discussion and interpretation of practices relating to 
FRL.The application of FRL is to be reviewed in relation to the selected listed grounds. It will 
also include an analysis of the concept by South African courts. 
 
Conclusions are made as to whether the legislation is discriminatory and necessary 
recommendations following from this are then presented. 
 
 




THE CULTURAL DEFINITION OF FAMILY 
 
2.1 Introduction General Definition 
A family is defined differently by different dictionaries, which each provide different versions in 
accordance with different uses.  For example, a family may be described in terms of relationship 
as “a group of people who are closely related by blood, as parents, children, uncles, aunts and 
cousins”.34 Further classifications may be in terms of function, referring to parents rearing their 
children and to people who live together and operate as a single household or even through 
lineage (ancestry), bringing together all descendants of a common progenitor (ancestor).35 
 
The concept of immediate family is also used in legal documents.  The concept is said to 
describe the family in its extended form of the one above to also include siblings, spouses, step-
children and parents, foster children and parents, in-laws, siblings in-laws, grand and great-
parents, step-grand and great-parent.36 Foster parenting is regarded as a form of adoption 
wherein children are legally placed in places of shelter for their safety.37 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections, the definition in relation to the Western culture and 
the African understanding of what a family is. Reasons for the inclusion of the two 
understandings are; 1) to acquire an understanding of the Western influence on law making in a 
previously colonised state, for the sake of this study and 2) to gain an understanding of what 
constitutes a family, by the African group said to be affected by possible discriminatory actions 
in the workplaces.  In both cases, the definitions seem to be affected by changes in behaviour 




                                                          
34Dictionary Reference www.dictionary.reference.com accessed on 14 November 2014  
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
37Fostercare www.fostercare.com accessed on 9 December 2014 
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2.2 The Western/Eurocentric Meaning of a Family 
 
Prior to the interrogation of any of the definitions alluded to by different authors, it is important 
to note the warning by Popenoe, that the term family “has been used in so many ambiguous ways 
in recent years that the explanation of its use has special importance” and that “the term has even 
become controversial”.38 A broader understanding of what a family is may help unveil the 
African meaning of the word. Bengtson argues that a family is a “process” or system that is 
influenced by members of its group (in this sense group meaning constituency).39 This explained 
dynamism of the process, which diminishes the idea of family as a structure, emphasises its 
functional behaviour in which members interact within a pattern of behaviour understood within 
parameters of relations among members of the group.  
 
In its origin, an English family is said to have included the next of kin of the householder as well 
as servants40.  An historic analysis by Bengtson41 portrays the process of change as moving from 
an extended nuclear and social institution of the 19th century based on law and customs to a 
typical white modern family with just two generations, parents and their children. This 
traditional nuclear family is said to be characterised by lifelong marriages with well-defined 
division of labour.  Men possessed and maintained authority in the family and females were 
restrained to housewife functions.  The families were responsible for procreation, socialisation of 
children, care, affection, companionship, sharing of (economic) resources such as food, shelter 
and clothing and sexual regulation.42  In the latter instance, members would be expected to be 
responsible for the outcomes of their sexuality.43 
 
The process theory explains reasons why some authors agree on the evolution of a family, which 
others refer to as a family decline.44 Later, family is said to have declined from being a social 
                                                          
38Popenoe (note 22 above) 527-542. 
39 VL Bengtson ‘Beyond the Nuclear Family: The Increasing importance of Multigenerational Bonds’ (2001) 
63Journal of Marriage and Family 1-16. 
40Merriam Webster Dictionary www.merriam-webster.dictionary.com accessed 14 November 2014 
41Bengtson (note 39 above) 3 
42Ibid. 
43Dictionary Reference (note 34 above) defines sexuality as follows:1. sexual character; possession of the structural 
and functional traits of sex. 2. recognition of or emphasis upon sexual matters.  
44Popenoe (note22 above); J Stacey‘Good Riddance to “The Family”: A response to David Popenoe’(1996) 55(3) 
Journal of Marriage and Family 545-547. 
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institution to that which provides emotional support. The modern family is referred to by 
Stacey45 as the post-modern family, influenced by urbanisation, secularism46 and the 
emancipation of women.  This break-up of the nuclear family was observed in the 21st century, 
wherein the function of a family became; child bearing, affection and companionship.  This type 
of family, it has been argued, provides legitimacy to individual needs over collective goals and is 
said to have weakened the family as an institution that is meant to nurture its members.47 
 
The changes in behaviour made way for heterogeneity in family forms.  Whereas initially 
kinship was most important in the family institution, forms with “relations extending beyond 
biological and conjugal relations”48 emerged.  Several factors have been identified that led 
Popenoe49 to restrict the definition of a 21st century to “a group of kin consisting of at least one 
adult and one dependent”.  These are: the acceptability of divorce controls on family size 
(reduced fertility rate), working mothers, step-parenting, single-parenting, out-of-wedlock-births, 
cohabitation and a decline in marriages.50  All these are viewed as posing a threat to and 
diminishing cultural values and the role of nurturance.  
 
Observed consequences of these factors are the main reasons why the change is referred to as a 
decline of the institution of family in the Western culture.  In the United States in particular, it is 
alleged that functions that were traditionally undertaken by families have been taken over by 
other institutions, making families less important and less motivated.51 Such institutions as those 
of religion, education and others, left families weaker, with no direct authority and function. 
 
Popenoe acknowledges that his narrow western definition “is not broad enough to include many 
family forms prominent in other cultures, such as that consisting of several kin groups leaving in 
a single, complex household”, but indicated that a more inclusive definition “would be less 
                                                          
45Stacey (note 44above) 546. 
46Brittanica defines –secularism as movement in society directed away from other worldliness, for example, when 
people show interest in human cultural achievements and possibilities of their fulfillment in the world. 
www.britannica.com accessed 14 November 2014 
47Popenoe (note 22 above) 528-529. 
48Bengtson (note 39 above) 1-2. 
49Popenoe (note 22 above) 529. 
50Ibid. 
51Bengtson (note 39 aboveError! Bookmark not defined.)3-4.   
Page | 30 
 
meaningful”.52 This acknowledgement of the existence of structures and functions in other 
cultures serve as a distinction of the Western definition from other cultures.   
 
Bengtson53 observes that Popenoe’s definition excludes family extensions beyond co-residence 
boundaries such as those involving multigenerational extensions recently resulting from 
prolonged existence due to improved health.  The support provided by grand-parents in single-
parent families such as in cases where there has been a divorce, out-of-wedlock births and the 
families with step-parents has become a pillar of strength in recent years.  The involvement of a 
variety of kin54 and non-kin relations is an extension beyond an extended family and the 
arrangement has become acceptable to communities in the 21st century. This is because, 
according to Stacey55, arrangements such as divorce and step-parenting have been normalised 
since the 20th century, the era that Stacey refers to as a post-modern era, which allows 
“democratic forms of intimacy”.56 Therefore, the traditional nuclear family is said to be ill-suited 
for the era.  This diverse family form, resembles and accommodates the historic matriarchal57 
structures of the African American families.58 
 
Bengtson refers to Stacey as insinuating that these somewhat extended family forms,59 are more 
common and significant among Blacks than they are among Whites in the United States.  
Bengtson alleges that: 
 
“over the century, there have been significant changes in the family’s structure and function.  
Prominent among them has been the extension of family bonds of affection and affirmation, to 
                                                          
52Popenoe (note 22 above) 529. 
53Bengstone (note 39 above) 4. 
54Merriam Webster dictionary (note 40 above) defines ‘kin’ as ‘a group of persons of common ancestry’.  
55Stacey (note 44 above) 546. 
56Postmodernism is a late-20th-century movement in the arts, architecture, and criticism that was a departure from 
modernism. Postmodernism includes skeptical interpretations of culture, literature, art, philosophy, history, 
economics, architecture, fiction, and literary criticism. It is often associated with deconstruction and post-
structuralism because its usage as a term gained significant popularity at the same time as twentieth-century post-
structural thought. Modernism is a philosophical movement that, along with cultural trends and changes, arose from 
wide-scale and far-reaching transformations in Western society in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
57A matriarchy is a social organisational form in which the mother or oldest female heads the family. Dictionary 
Reference (note 34 above) 
58Stacey (note 44 above) 546. 
59Bengtson (note 39 above) 13. 
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help and support members, across several generations, whether these be biological ties or the 
creation of kinlike relationship”.60 
 
The simplest way to avert the controversy of the definition seems to be the acceptance of the 
existence of partisan and cultural explanations and to align behaviour different races with their 
explanations. 
 
2.3 Family in the African/South African Context 
 
Debates on African family are said to be affected by the bias of literature, with Eurocentric 
descriptions and terminologies seemingly to undermine realities of the African tradition. 
Tembo61 advises that the biased Eurocentric perspective does not accurately reflect a traditional 
family and “portray[s] African relationships as being negative, rigid and miserable”.  The 
absence of clear understanding of African practices by some authors is said to have resulted in an 
overlay of perceptions and practices of other countries in an attempt to create an understanding 
of the local situation.  For example, a nuclear family is a Western concept, and its use as a base 
of understanding form and function of an African family is described as problematic by some 
authors62. Tembo alludes to an unfortunate situation in which he alleges that the African tradition 
has not been treated “as social phenomena (non) that was legitimate and workable in its own 
African social circumstances and environment. But rather as curiosities that were to succumb to 
superior European” practices.63 
 
Nyoka64 comments that sociologists in South Africa take the easy way out by superimposing 
“preconceived schemata on local data” and base analyses on the findings rather than the real 
situation of an African family.  That is, that reliance on some of the information in literature may 
introduce misconceptions that make the understanding of the African cultural practices difficult.  
                                                          
60Bengtson (note 39 above) 14. 
61 MS Tembo ‘The Traditional African 
family’http://people.btidgewater.edu/~mtembo/menu/articles/TraditionalAfricanFamily.shtml accessed on 
13/10/13. 
62 B Nyoka‘Negation and Affirmation: a critique of sociology in South Africa’ (2013) 17(1) African Sociological 
Review 2-23; Tembo (note 61 above) 6. 
63Tembo (note 61 above) 6. 
64Nyoka (note 62 above) 11. 
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Some behaviour expectations occur that may result in unintended acts of discrimination, deter 
normal behaviour of others or even cause those that continue to practice their culture to feel 
disadvantaged.  Discussions below may show some such effects as the African/South African65 
family is discussed.  
 
For a clearer understanding of what a family implies in the South African context, especially to 
Africans, it is necessary to briefly review the historic setup of an African family.  Bigombe and 
Khadiagala66 refer to African families as stable, large, multigenerational, durable and socially 
reinforcing. This is despite the broad spectrum of African traditions creating variations in “tribal 
customs or culture” across geographic areas.67 According to Nzimande, African (Black) families 
in South Africa have similar structures in substance (core functions) across the different ethnic 
groups, and that differences are only observed in detail (specific features).68  The general African 
family would include the domestic family (mother, father and children) plus close relatives 
(maybe blood or non-blood, for example a polygamous mother is not necessarily a blood relative 
unless the traditional kin marriages are arranged) such as uncles, aunts and in some cases 
polygamous mothers. All of whom serve as other mothers and fathers in the family and who will 
assume responsibility of care in instances where the biological parents (mother, father) are not 
available.69Nzimande70 also emphasises the care and support expected of members of a family 
and traditionally governed by rules in a society. 
 
The difference between Black and White families in South Africa has been documented. Russell 
indicates that the Western practices limit relations only to people sharing parents and refer to 
other relatives as too remote.71  The difference is also emphasized by Ziehl who indicated that 
                                                          
65Some of the authors generalise on the African culture in general while others only look at the local situation in 
South Africa. For the sake of this study, discussions refer to both situations at the same time. 
66Bigombe and GM Khadiagala‘2001 Major Trends Affecting Families in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
http://www.undesadspd.org. 
67Tembo (note 61 above) 7.  
68Nzimande(note 23 above) 28-45 
69 A Okon ‘Towards defining the ‘right to a family’ for the African child’(2012) 12(2) African Human Rights Law 
Journal 373, 393. 
70Nzimande (note 23 above) 34. 
71M Russell ‘Understanding Black Households: The Problem. Social Dynamics’ (2003) 29(2) Journal of African 
Studies 5-49. 
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the differences occur despite evolution.72 For the sake of simplifying discussions in this study, 
the African type of family will be referred to as an extended family (despite the fact that it is a 
Eurocentric term which may distort the real meaning of the African type of family) and the 
Western/Eurocentric type as nuclear despite the stated evolutionary processes.   
 
The African family, according to Nzimande,73 has a structural base for “helping behaviour” with 
a sense of obligation for mutual assistance and the provision of security for kinship members 
including orphans, widows and even the older generation.  Therefore, any family member 
requiring assistance is the responsibility of an “able brother” in terms of roles.  Of importance to 
this study, is the fact that “in death and other grievous misfortunes, group responsibility and 
sharing in the sadness (is) expected of all kinship members”.74 
 
Okon adds to the list, people excluding blood relatives, who may have carried the responsibility 
of care over a certain period of time, and “became psychologically and emotionally attached to 
the child without necessarily acquiring legal rights and responsibilities in respect of the child”.75  
This added dimension is very important in understanding relations that may exist between two 
people that are not blood relatives but carry with them emotional attachment that cannot be 
separated even by non-sympathetic laws in workplaces.   
 
The dimension forms the crux of the family institution among Africans, which does not provide 
allowance to added classification such as “immediate family” and other constructions that deem 
to define degree of relationship or distance in family relations. Therefore, the term immediate 
family membership is a Western construction and suits the conditions of the type of family 
arrangement in the Western culture.  If it has to be used in the African context, it will have to be 
defined by the parties concerned, in relation to psychological and emotional attachment and not 
only in accordance with blood relationship. 
 
                                                          
72S Ziehl‘Black South Africans do live in nuclear family households – a response to Russell.’(2002) 33(1) Society in 
Transit 26-49. 
73Nzimande (note 23 above) 34. 
74Nzimande (note 23 above) 39. 
75Okon (note 69 above) 389. 
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Tembo also explains that the strength and durability of African families did not require “a 
distinction between the biological and non-biological kin as far as primary parental obligations 
were concerned”.76 It is in these types of families that family traditions are protected from 
external traditional ‘contamination’ and transferred from generation to generation.  It is for this 
reason that Tembo accuses the Eurocentric description of the African family as biased and 
overshadowing important features that upheld the African families and that may incidentally still 
be existing and upholding the positive traditional aspect. Okon identify some such African 
family features as “the responsibility for the protection, upbringing and development of the 
child”.77 
 
The older generation formed the base of the family in the olden days as they played an important 
role in the ancestral line.  Seniority has always been respected and the elderly “accorded a place 
of honour in the lineage hierarchy”, explains Nzimande.78This arrangement maintained their (the 
elderly) privileges for continued care.  Their care has therefore always been non-formal but 
important and as Bigombe and Khadiagala79 assert, there existed an essential mutual 
intergenerational care that placed the older generation in important positions, that is, not only at 
the receiving end but also undertaking important roles.   
 
Unfortunately, the family forms and functions in South Africa are said to have been affected by 
external forces such as colonisation and industrialisation.  Whereas colonisation emerged with its 
influential religious forces that seemed to undermine the majority of African practices, negating 
some of the activities and characterising others as ‘depraved’ (immoral/evil/wicked) 
industrialisation imposed economic burdens that created unavoidable situations of change in 
some instances80.  Mining and commercialised agriculture are said to have initiated the process 
of migration and are blamed for breaking bonds of goodwill that sustained African families.81 
 
                                                          
76Tembo (note 61 above) 6. 
77Okon (note 69 above) 374. 
78Nzimande (note 23 above) 37. 
79Bigombe et al (note 66 above) 17. 
80Nzimande (note 23 above) 29; Russell (note 71 above) 17 and Tembo (note 61 above) 6-7. 
81Bigombe et al (note 66 above) 2. 
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Families in the industrial areas became smaller, consisting of the father, the mother and children.  
These fitted the Eurocentric description of a nuclear family.  The provision of small houses to 
migrants compelled families to reduce in size, forcing Africans to rearrange their family 
forms.82At this stage Africans fitted themselves within what Russell refers to as the “oppressor’s 
culture” as they were compelled by circumstances.83 
 
Ziehl warns of the danger of thinking that a nuclear family is the “pre-eminent bourgeois’ 
institution” and explains that: 
 
“a great deal of effort and energy has been expended on showing how wrong it is to treat other 
family structures as deviations from this norm and therefore to assume that the nuclear family is 
the only legitimate family structure”.84 
 
The author alludes to the ‘Western stereotype’ that alleges that ‘Western ways are better than 
African ways’85 and that colonisation intended to improve the Black culture by making it like a 
Western one.  It may be this ‘West is best’ phenomenon that may have initially diluted the 
African culture among some of the urban Africans.  It may also have been the same phenomenon 
that might have given the oppressors an impression that their culture is applauded by the 
Africans when they (the Africans) had no choice but to succumb to the situations of the time.   
The laws of the country at the time would be expected to accommodate the oppressor’s way of 
life and Africans would be expected to abide. 
 
In the initial stages of the migrant period children were brought up by their grandparents as their 
parents would have migrated.  At this stage the grandparents were still able to enforce customary 
practices and the ethos of an African extended family, guaranteeing the wellbeing of a child 
throughout life.   
 
                                                          
82Nzimande (note 23 above) 31; Russell (note 71 above) 5-7. 
83M Russell ‘Are Urban Black Families Nuclear? A comparative study of Black and White South African Family 
Norm. Social Dynamics’ (2003) 29(2) Journal of African Studies 153-176. 
84Ziehl (note 72 above) 32. 
85Ibid 33-34. 
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Changes in African families have been observed to occur differently in different regions, 
furthering diversity across the Continent over different periods of time.  According to Okon, the 
complexity of a family has occurred from “era to era”.86  Transformation processes have added 
another burden to the African tradition degeneration, further affecting the traditional “corporate 
kinship” and reducing families to the exclusion of other relatives.  The ‘un-African’ exclusion of 
others is the result of the forces of economic burdens that disabled the existence of large 
families, forcing fertility rates to drop in both rural and urban areas.  The arrangement, which 
Bigombe and Khadiagala87 refers to as a modern urban arrangement, has negatively affected the 
care of the older generation, tarnishing the social aspect that provided for their support. This is 
especially observable in rural areas (where the majority of them were left behind) as these areas 
became more affected by poverty. 
 
Despite the external forces of changes, Bigombe and Khadiagala88 reported that there were no 
indications of African families completely abandoning traditional practices.  What are observable 
are families that are a hybrid of traditional and modern norms. The authors agree with Russell in 
believing that African families adapt to new environments by adopting new practices and 
drawing solutions from the “traditional resources”, but further contend that the “process of social 
adaptation of family organizations has produced an uneasy amalgam that is yet to crystallize into 
a dominant pattern”.89  The non-committal of Blacks (Africans) to the Eurocentric life is 
confirmed by Russell who observed that, despite all forces that influence changes of family 
structure including the economic forces and transformation, urban Blacks in South Africa are 
divided between adherence to Eurocentric standards and the African tradition which are still 
observable in rural life.90 
 
Russell91 accedes to the assumption that a complete nuclear arrangement among Black (African) 
South Africans cannot be ‘validated’ in the contemporary South Africa, because complete 
rejection of traditional practices cannot be guaranteed.  Therefore, Black (African) nuclear 
                                                          
86Okon (note 69 above) 374-381. 
87Bigombe et al (note 66 above) 19. 
88Bigombe (note 66 above) 12. 
89Bigombe (note 66 above) 2. 
90Russell (note 83 above) 153-155.  
91Russell (note 71 above) 39. 
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family is different from that which defined by Eurocentric standards, as they continue to have 
relatives accommodated for the sake of support.92  This is because families are still bound by 
care obligations.  Nzimande explains that irrespective of the nuclear arrangement, “the wide 
circle of relatives in Black family structure is still … expected to lend a helping hand as a 
support measure in times of hardship and distress” as support always had its base in extended 
families.93 
 
The cycle of events experienced in the Western countries seem to be experienced in Africa too.  
Stacey94 and Bengtson95 alluded to the post-modern era in which the nuclear family is said to be 
deteriorating and multi-generational families are gaining ground.   With the ‘collapse of the 
nuclear family’ and the rise of contemporary factors (such as female headed families, economic 
stresses, women involved in the labour market) there are emerging signs of a reverse action 
towards an extended family practices among Africans.  The older generation is now seen to be 
fulfilling meaningful roles with their pensions and once more adding value by caring for their 
families.96 It would be expected that the grandparents would assume the roles of creating family 
stability and harmony, and the promotion of family ethos of African extended families even in 
the urban areas.  It is thus expected that with the new system in South Africa, which recognises 
all cultures in the country added to the secular effects of evolution, the African family will find 
its space in the laws of this country and areas in which such laws are applicable. 
 
As discussed in 2.2 and 2.3 above, there is a contextual difference between families in Western 
and African cultures.  Although Ziehl97 warns of the confusion brought about by “conceptual 
ambiguity”, there are two indications that seem to protect the traditional form and function of the 
Africa family.  The first is resistance staged by those who continue to adhere to corporate 
(group) kinship system of extended families.  The second factor is evolution, mainly affected by 
transformation, which has swayed the rigid nuclear family more towards extended family form.      
 
                                                          
92Nzimande (note 23 above) 34. 
93Nzimande (note 23 above) 34. 
94Stacey (note 44 above) 546. 
95Bengtson (note 39 above) 1. 
96Bigombe et al (note 66 above) 8-9.   
97Ziehl (note 72 above) 29. 
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2.4 The Definition of Family in relation to Family Responsibilities 
 
The complexity of defining the African family is said to be exaggerated by the diverse traditional 
patterns on the African continent.  Both Okon98 and Tembo99 refer to various family structures 
and patterns in different regions and suggest that a definition be based on functionality within 
societal condition.  Therefore, a universally accepted definition of family, according to the 
authors, should be inclusive of families from different cultures and historic periods.  Whereas the 
universality may result in furthering ambiguity resulting from the broad inclusivity, making it 
difficult to design legislative strategies, knowledge of the existence of the problems affecting the 
definition is a step in the right direction. 
 
Some authors have attempts to produce more contemporary and less restrictive definitions. 
Murdock100 defines family as adults related by blood or marriage of even affiliation, who 
cooperate economically, who may share a common dwelling and who may rear children.  The 
definition may be broad enough but excludes those individuals who do not cooperate 
economically. Winch101 on the other hand, defines family as a group of related persons in 
different positions within the family who fulfil the functions necessary for the existence and 
survival of the family. 
 
Nzimande102 refers to Steyn and Rip (1968, 500) and suggests that in South Africa, the use of 
some resemblances showing a marked degree of cultural cohesion ‘can help determine generally 
broad outlined patterns’ and characteristics of a family.  The generalised patterns would be 
helpful in defining a family within the African context.  For example, support among Africans, 
as stated earlier, is expected from all members of the family, “in terms of hardships and 
distress”.103  Considering all blood and non-blood relatives that exist in a family, employers 
would require an understanding of the reason why such members would apply for a family 
                                                          
98Okon (note 69 above) 388-389. 
99Tembo (note 61 above) 6-7. 
100 Murdock, GP ‘Social Structure’ in JL Roopnarine& UP Gielen (ed). Families in a Global perspective Boston: 
Pearson/Allyn and Bacon (1949/2005). 
101 RF Winch ‘Towards a model of familial organisation’ W R Burr et al (eds) Contemporary theories about family 
(1979) 162-179. 
102Nzimande (note 23 above) 30-31. 
103Nzimande (note 23 above). 34 
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responsibility leave.  Nzimande explains family by referring to roles and responsibilities when he 
refers to family as a “primary source of social support”.104  He further explains expectations in 
family arrangement, which serve as guiding principles, stating that “through a set of 
prescriptions, values and socialization patterns a sense of social obligations is created and 
exercised.”105  It is therefore expected that the laws of employment will provide a fairly 
accommodating definition that allows parties to further clarify relationships where they are not 
obvious.   
 
The above statements promote the understanding of expected responsibilities that employees will 
not overlook. First, the family prescriptions should be expected when dealing with African 
employees.  Secondly, such prescriptions cannot be undermined; and thirdly an understanding of 
binding social obligations and mutual support is necessary.    
 
As stated, the term immediate family can be confusing when an African family is discussed, and 
this may need to be avoided.  Subscription to the Eurocentric description of family, the nuclear 
family, excludes practices of others and thus consciously or unconsciously leads to acts of 
differentiation.  For the sake of this study, it is therefore important to study legislative documents 
that influence and guide employer behaviour and operation in relation to family responsibility 
leave.  If the documents are found to undermine some cultural practices, they will be regarded as 





The definition of family in the Western culture is narrow, more structured and restricted to 
kinship. In its evolution, in the post-modern era, the definition extends beyond two generations 
to accommodate grand-parents. The extension includes also step-parents, out-of-wedlock 
children and cohabitation. This democratic form of a family also includes the matriarchal 
structures previously observed in the African cultures. Although the Western family moved from 
                                                          
104Ibid 35. 
105Ibid 35. 
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nuclear to the extended type, and to the addition of help and support, the emphasis is still placed 
on biological ties and kinship relations. 
 
There are indications that the family in the African culture cannot carry a Eurocentric description 
as this will introduce misconceptions that will deter understanding of the African cultural 
practices. African families are said to be large, stable, multigenerational and socially reinforcing. 
The latter conduct is explained by the presence of several mothers and fathers in the family that 
may be blood or non-blood with helping behaviour that creates psychological and emotional 
attachment with those receiving their care and support. The care and support marks the emphasis 
of functionality in the African family. 
 
The inclusion of a foster relationship to the extended Western family, the concept mainly 
introduced to the definition of immediate family, brings to the definition the element of care and 
support, except that the foster relationship introduced cannot be compared to the psychological 
and emotional attachment created between non-blood persons in the African culture. 
 
Family in the African culture has resisted forces of colonisation and industrialisation and even 
though small houses allocated to migrants have reduced family size, cultural practice have 
persisted. Therefore, even when new practices are adopted, solutions are continuously drawn 
from traditional resources especially when care and support are needed. 
 
This chapter has clearly differentiated between the Western and African definitions of the 
concept family. It is concluded that the traditional kinship structure continues to shape the basic 
family form among Africans, even within the colonial influence. It is therefore important to note 
that the care and support portrayed in the African culture will always be expected from family 
members, especially in terms of hardship and distress. Therefore, the laws of employment have 
to be sensitive to this arrangement if the culture of the African people is to be recognised and 
their rights respected. In this way, international laws and the Constitution of the country will be 
upheld. Clear understanding of these responsibilities is important to both employers and 
employees to harmonise relations in the workplaces.  
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This chapter dealt with the definition of family in the Western and African Culture. Chapter 3 
will focus on the legal definition of family as set out in various sources and legislation. The 
analysis will appear in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the concept of family responsibility, it is necessary to first understand the 
definition of family as contained in several legal documents. These include global/international 
conventions, regional documents/commitments and domestic legislation. The international 
instruments considered have been ratified by South Africa and are therefore applicable in the 
development, interpretation and application of South African law. However, in order for the 
instruments to be binding; they must be incorporated in South African legislation. Thus this 
chapter discusses, as a prelude, the legal definitions of family responsibility in the various 
documents, whilst the next chapter will elaborate on the potentially discriminatory impact of a 
narrow definition of family responsibility that neglects African cultural family responsibility and 
the relevant provisions in the domestic legislation. 
 
3.2 International and Regional Instruments 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) both define family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society entitled to protection by society and the state”.106 A similar definition is offered by the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR).107 The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990108 states that a family is a fundamental group of 
society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of its members who should be 
afforded necessary protection and assistance to fully assume its responsibilities within the 
community. These international conventions have been incorporated in the Bill of Rights, 
Chapter 2, of the South African Constitution, 1996.109 
 
                                                          
106 Article 16,3 of the 1948 Declaration and Article 23,1 of the 1996 International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights.  
107 Article 10(1). 
108 In the preamble. 
109PE Andrews ‘Incorporating Human Rights Law in National Constitution: The South African Experience’ 
www.parlemo.edu/archivos-content/derecho/pdf/international-human-rights.pdf (accessed 17 December 2014) 
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The International Conference on Population Development-Plan of Action, 1994110 and the World 
Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, Denmark, March 1995 both define a family as a 
basic unit of society and recognise that there are various forms of families in different cultural, 
political and social systems.  
 
The international instruments considered here reflect the definitions proffered in the instruments 
ratified or adopted by South Africa. What appears from these documents is that family is 
considered as a group or unit with responsibilities and that there are various forms which would 
be dependent on or defined by the circumstances including culture. In the definitions, the 
instruments have not provided it a restrictive or confined meaning. Most of them carry the same 
definition leading to a conclusion that family must be accepted to mean a group of person who 
are together for a specific purpose, this is wide and can refer to any group.  
 
The relevant regional documents are discussed below. These include the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Right (1981)111 which define the family as the natural unit and basis for 
society. Meanwhile, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)112 and the 
African Youth Charter (2006) define family as a natural unit and basis for society. These 
definitions from the regional documents are identical and have some resemblance to the 
international instruments/documents. Article 18 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child provides that the family shall enjoy special protection through recognising the role 
that the family plays in society.  According to Gose, the emphasis that the Charter places on the 
notion of the family is very much from the African perspective.113  As such, even distant 
relatives are recognised.114 
 
Notably, neither the international instruments have sought to give the term a classification or 
restrictive meaning. 
 
                                                          
110 Chapter II Principle 9. 
111 Article 18. 
112 Article 18 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) and Article 8 of the African 
Youth Charter (2006). 
113M Gose ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2002) Children’s Rights Project: 
Community Law Centre 97.  
114Ibid. 
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3.3 South African policy  
In South Africa, the definition of family in policy, particularly White Papers, has generally been 
inclusive of various family forms.  The White Paper for Social Welfare115 defines family: 
 
“as individuals who either by contract or agreement choose to live together intimately and 
function as a unit in a social and economic system. The family is primarily a social unit which 
ideally provide care, nurturing and socialisation for its members”.  
 
There is no classification of who the members of the family are or should be. The draft White 
Paper on Families in South Africa116 in its glossary of terms defines family as: 
 
“[a] societal group that is related by blood (kinship), adoption, foster care or the ties of marriage 
(civil, customary or religious), civil union or cohabitation and go beyond a particular physical 
residence.” 
 
The 1977 Social Welfare White Paper offered a definition similar to the international instruments 
and regional documents in that it described the family as a unit but made this dependent on a 
choice to live together intimately. Notably, having defined family, the 2012 White Paper goes on 
to define a nuclear family and extended family. A nuclear family is defined as “a family group 
consisting of parents with their biological or adoptive children only” while an extended family is 
defined as “a multigenerational family that may or may not share the same household.”117 
 
The Green Paper on Families118 acknowledged that there are different types of families in South 
Africa which are products of various cultures and social contexts. It is therefore crucial to 
recognise the country’s diverse nature in all initiatives to address their plight. In analysing the 
country’s challenges, the changing family structures and the history which shaped it must be 
taken into account. Colonisation and Apartheid played a major role in shaping families in South 
                                                          
115 Government Gazette 18166, Government Notice 1108 of 8 August 1977 at 93. 
116Draft White Paper on Families (October 2012) www.dsd.gov.za/index2.php? at 3 (accessed on 3 November 
2014). 
117Ibid glossary of terms. 
118 Item 1.8 of the Green Paper on Families: Promoting Family life and Strengthening Families in South Africa, 3 
October 2011, www.thepresidency.gov.za/(accessed on 4 November 2014). 
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Africa.119 Indigenous African population with ethnic groups are in the majority followed by a 
significant number of Europeans and then Indians, Chinese and Coloureds.120Other than the 
policy documents (the Green and White Papers), there appears to be no legislation proffering a 
definition. This is supported by the White Paper on Families121 which records that following the 
new dispensation in 1994, the South African government implemented various policies and 
legislation aimed at transforming the country but the concept of family was not explicitly 
addressed in any of these documents.  
 
An analysis of the white paper document leads to a clearer formulation of the definition of a 
family. It is argued therefore that South African legislation dealing with family must conform to 
this definition since it is derived from a combination of international instruments ratified and/or 
adopted by the country and regional commitments. The Green and the White Papers relating to 
family are a step towards providing legislation. It is therefore advisable to take them into account 
in interpreting the legal position or meaning of the concept.  
 
3.4 South African Law Employment law 
The South African legislative framework for family responsibility and the cases that have 
interpreted FR and FRL will be considered next.  First, will be a discussion of the relevant 
provisions of FR and FRIL in the South African Constitution, the Employment Equity Act 
(EEA), the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act122 (PEPUDA), 
the BCEA and collective agreements.  The intention is to compare the definitions with the 
descriptions in the cultural practices to study compatibility. Case law will then be reviewed to 






                                                          
119 Ibid at item 2.1. 
120 Ibid. 
121 White Paper on Families (note above)  Introduction. 
122Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). 
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3.4.1. The Constitution 
 
The South African Constitution123 is the supreme law of the country providing a framework 
within which all other laws are formulated or changes. The supremacy of the Constitution may 
only be limited as provided for in the Constitution.124 As the highest law of the land, all laws 
must conform to the standard set in the Constitution. Legislation passed prior to the Constitution 
must be amended to ensure conformity while successive legislation may not be passed unless it 
conforms125 to the Constitution.  
 
The Constitution confers the right to fair labour practices in section 23(1). This right emanates 
from a rich jurisprudence developed by the Industrial Court prior to 1995. As stated by Cheadle, 
this right is unique to South African Bill of Rights.126 The unique inclusion of the right to fair 
labour practices in the South African Constitution was stressed by Ngcobo J in National 
Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (NEHAWU 
judgment).127 The court found that legislature had left the interpretation of the right to the courts 
as fairness was depended upon the circumstances and the courts had to balance fairness taking 
into account the rights of the employees against the interests of employers. It was ultimately the 
role of the Constitutional Court to ensure that the right guaranteed in section 23(1) is 
honoured.128 The court held that the right in section 23(1) was guaranteed to both the employer 
and the employee.129 
 
The Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination on a number of grounds, including 
culture.130Family responsibility, however, is not listed. Family responsibility may however be 
protected as an analogous ground associated with the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic 
                                                          
123 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996. 
124Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 877 
(CC), Section 2 of the Constitution. 
125 M Finnemore and R van Rensburg ‘Contemporary Labour Relations’ 2nded (2002) LexisNexis 203. 
126 H Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ in Cheadle H, Davis D and N Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill 
of Rights (2002) LexisNexis 365. 
127National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town (NEHAWU judgment) 2003 (3) 
SA 1 (CC). 
128Ibid paras 33-35. 
129Ibid para 39. 
130Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
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Communities.131 This is because the right has not been interpreted in the workplace context 
before. 
 
3.4.2. The BCEA 
 
Prior to the 1996 Constitution, various legislation regulated employment relations including the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983 (the 1983 BCEA). The 1983 BCEA regulated 
basic conditions of employment including working hours, leave entitlements and termination of 
contracts of employment. The leave provision did not provide for family responsibility leave as 
one of the entitlements. The 1983 BCEA was repealed and replaced with the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the 1997 BCEA). This was following the promulgation of the new 
Constitution132 in South Africa. The passing of the new BCEA in 1997 was to ensure conformity 
with the Constitution especially the rights conferred in the Bill of Rights, international 
instruments and regional documents which recognise the importance of families and the need to 
accommodate workers with family responsibility.  
 
In terms of the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1997 BCEA, one of its primary objects was to 
provide minimum working conditions for unorganised and vulnerable workers.133 The 1997 
BCEA, is the focus of this study. Its purpose is to establish and enforce basic conditions of 
employment and to regulate variations to such conditions.134 The BCEA has broader scope of 
application as it protects employees from all sectors establishing what Basson135 calls “a floor of 
basic conditions protecting all employees”. It can be concluded from a reading of the 
Explanatory Memorandum and the BCEA that the intention of the legislature was to assist 
parties to the employment relationship, the employer and the employee, to have a base upon 
which their relationship would be regulated. This conclusion runs parallel to the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of Section 23(1) of the Constitution in the NEHAWU judgment.  
 
                                                          
131Section 31 of the Constitution. 
132 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
133 D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie ‘Labour Relations Law – A 
Comprehensive Guide’ 3rded (2000) Butterworths 514. 
134 Section 2 of the BCEA. 
135 A Basson, M Christianson, C Garbes, PAK le Roux, C Mischke and EML Strydom ‘Essential Labour Law – 
Individual Labour Law Volume 1’ 2nded(2000) Labour Law Publications 288. 
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Amongst other provisions, the BCEA sets out employees’ entitlement to leave that are regulated 
within its own parameters.136 FRL is amongst the leave entitlements conferred in the BCEA. It 
was the first time in South African law that family responsibility was dealt with as the concept 
did not exist prior to the 1997 BCEA.137 The provision of section 27(2) of the BCEA relating to 
FRL provides as follows: 
 
“27(2) An employer must grant an employee, during each annual leave cycle, at the request of the 
employee, three days’ paid leave, which the employee is entitled to take- 
 (a) when the employee’s child is born; 
 (b) when the employee’s child is sick; or 
 (c) in the event of the death of- 
    (i) the employee’s spouse or life partner; or 
(ii) the employee’s parent, adoptive parent, grandparent, child, adopted 
child, grandchild or sibling.” 
 
There is no definition proffered for the concept of FRL in the BCEA, despite the existence of a 
definition section in the BCEA.138 The meaning can therefore only be deduced from the wording 
on the relevant subsection. It is apparent from the above provisions of the section 27(2) that the 
definition that can be associated with the BCEA is that of a nuclear family as discussed in 
chapter 2 above. The concept of FRL was accordingly introduced by the 1997 Act for the first 
time in South African employment law.139 There is no travaux préparatoires or academic 
opinion to explain how the legislature elected the use of the nuclear family as opposed to the 
broader concept.  
 
According to Dancaster and Baird140the BCEA limits FRL to time off to attend to birth, sickness 
and death. The writers recommend for FRL to be expanded to include instances where care 
                                                          
136 Section 19 to 27 of the BCEA. 
137Du Toit (note 133 above) 533. 
138 Section 1 of the BCEA. 
139 Section 27 of the BCEA.  
140L Dancaster& M Baird “Workers with care responsibilities: is work-family integration adequately addressed in 
South African labour law? (2008) 29 ILJ 22, 30. 
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giving is required.141 In terms of Section 27(2) FRL is only available for the birth or illness of a 
child. It is therefore not available for attending to a sick adult dependant whereas in the event of 
death, the category of persons for whom it may be utilised is wider.142 Another factor raised by 
Dancaster and Baird is the duration allowed for the leave ranging between three to five days 
depending on the type of work.143 
 
The drafters of the BCEA appear to have taken into account various eventualities by providing a 
variation of some of the terms and conditions of employment including the leave provision.144 
However, the discretion by employers and bargaining parties seems to comply with the 
classification set in section 27(2) of the BCEA. The effect of the BCEA on employers is apparent 
even in instances where employers have concluded collective agreements to regulate their 
sectors. A consideration of several collective agreements reveal that despite being accorded the 
powers to vary the provisions of the BCEA through collective bargaining, parties in different 
sectors still utilise the classification offered by the BCEA with no regard to other relevant 
legislation. 
 
The FRL provision in the Motor Industry Bargaining Council145, a private sector, is similar to 
that in the BCEA.  In its main collective agreement, the Metal and Engineering Industry 
Bargaining Council, the MEIBC (also a private sector) fails to provide the definition of FRL.146 
The leave entitlement is similar to the one set out in the BCEA, with the deviation being in 
respect of allowing the FRL days to accumulate over a period of three years. The MEIBC in its 
FRL provision uses the term “compassionate leave” which appears to be used interchangeably 
with the word FRL. The term compassionate leave is also not defined leaving the parties to 
attach any meaning they deem necessary for their own purpose which in some instances my 
appear as breaking the law with and serious consequences.  
 
                                                          
141Ibid 31. 
142Ibid  31-32. 
143Ibid  32. 
144 Section 49 of the BCEA. 
145Government Gazette No. 37508 Part1, 4 April 2014 at 92 
146Clause 42 of the Main Collective Agreement  published under Government Notices R.747 and R.748 in 
Government Gazette No 34613 dated 23 September 2011, substituted by R.1374 of 3 October 2003. 
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In the public sector, Resolution 7 of 2000 of the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council 
regulates employment conditions for all government departments and deal with the issue of 
FRL.147  The Resolution categorises FRL entitlement similar to the BCEA deviating only in 
terms of the number of days allowed. It affords more days and even allows for some annual leave 
to be converted to FRL where necessary. The only distinction with regard to the South African 
Local Government Bargaining Council, Main Collective Agreement148 regulating leave in the 
local government sectoris that while the BCEA provides for three days FRL, a total number of 
five days is allowed. Just like the BCEA there is no definition proffered by the collective 
agreements. 
 
Although not all collective agreements were considered, it is apparent that from the collective 
agreements listed above that there has been no deviation or variation of the concept of FRL from 
that which was determined in the BCEA even from organised bargaining. The only observable 
deviation is in respect of the number of days allocated to FRL and in some instances the ability 
to accumulate such leave.  This being the case, it is argued that there would be little if any 
deviation in unorganised employment environment.  
 
In 2014, the South African President established the Ministry for Small Business Development 
as a commitment to place economic growth and job creation at centre stage. This was due to the 
high unemployment rate faced by South Africa and to recognise the role players in small, 
medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs).149 Research by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
revealed that SMMEs created more than 50% of employment in South Africa.150  This research 
also views inflexible labour laws as contributing to the decline in the sector. SMMEs are mostly 
not unionised. They would therefore not have collective agreements regulating employment 
                                                          
147 Clause 7.7.3 of Resolution 7 of 2000 of the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council, 
http://www.pscbc.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Resolution-7-of-2000.pdf accessed 30 October 2014. 
148South African Local Government Bargaining Council, Main Collective Agreement 
www.salgbc.co.za/mainagreement, Part B clause 3.4 accssed 30 October 2014)  
149 This was part of a speech delivered by the Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu at the SMME 
Colloquium in Sandton on 1 October 2014 published in the Business Report 22 October 2014 on 
www.iol.co.za/business/opinopn/importance-of-smmes-is -big-business-for-country-1.1768670#.VGbTEZBvqD 
accessed 22 October 014.   
150M Herrington and D Kelley ‘African Entrepreneurship: Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Report, 2012’Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (2013) http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/2909/gem-2012-sub-saharan-africa-
regional-report accessed 15 November 2014. 
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conditions and would in most instances not have their own policies. They rely mainly on the 
provisions of the BCEA to provide them with employment terms and conditions to regulate their 
workplace.  
 
Reliance on the provisions of the BCEA means that SMMEs would utilise the family 
responsibility provision as appears in the BCEA and are unlikely to deviate from the provisions 
of section 27(2) as allowed by section 49 of the BCEA. The attitude of non-conducive labour 
laws would mean that employers would comply with what is provided in the BCEA for 
compliance purposes and not go the extra mile to assist and accommodate employees. In view of 
this, it is crucial that the provisions of the BCEA are wide and accommodating to provide for 
guidance to employers and accommodation of employees in the workplace. 
 
3.4.3. The EEA 
 
The EEA was promulgated to achieve equity in the workplace by promoting equal opportunity 
and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination.151  It is a tool 
within which unfair discrimination is to be prevented and where it already exists, eliminated.152  
It further prohibits unfair discrimination on listed grounds including the family responsibility and 
culture. 153 The EEA154 enjoys supremacy to all other employment law legislation and takes 
precedence in instances of conflict in laws.155 It is crucial to the transformation of the workplace. 
 
Unlike the BCEA, the EEA provides a definition which is crucial to this study. The definition of 
family responsibility in the EEA is provided as meaning the responsibility of employees in 
relation to their spouse or partner, their dependent children or other members of their immediate 
family who need their care or support. The EEA does not tender a definition of immediate family 
and leaves that to the parties to the employment relationship and interpretation by courts and 
bargaining councils should a dispute arise. 
 
                                                          
151 Section 2 of the EEA. 
152Basson et al (note 135 above) 266. 
153 Section 6 of the EEA 
154 Section 1 of the EEA. 
155Finnemore et al (note 125 above) 213. 
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Considering the definition of immediate family stated above,156 one can conclude that this 
definition is wider and can be interpreted to be inclusive of the cultural definition of family 
responsibility leave discussed in this study. This accommodation takes cognisance of the right to 
equality conferred by the Constitution.157 A better and complete understanding of the definition 
in the EEA requires consideration of the right to equality and the right to cultural practices158 in 
the Bill of Rights. 
 
An interpretation of the EEA, must be in compliance with the Constitution so as to give effect to 
its purpose taking into account any relevant code of good practice issued in terms of the EEA or 
any other employment law; and in compliance with the international law obligations of the 
Republic, in particular those contained in the International Labour Organisation Convention 
(111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.159 The obligation 
placed by this Convention is to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. 
 
In addition to the general supremacy that the EEA enjoys over other employment law legislation, 
the EEA specifically prohibits discrimination in any employment policy or practice. In the 
definition section of the EEA, the import of employment policy is set out as including 
remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of employment.160 An analysis of 
the purpose of the BCEA discussed above places the BCEA in the category of employment 
policy since it sets out basic terms and conditions of employment. If the BCEA is an 
employment policy, it may not unfairly discriminate against any employee on any of the grounds 
listed in section 6 of the EEA.  
 
In interpreting the BCEA, therefore, one must amongst other factors take into account the 
supremacy of the EEA over employment law legislation together with the fact that it is an 
employment policy, and it is specifically referred to and dealt with by the EEA under the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination. An interpretation of the BCEA can therefore not be isolated 
from the provisions of the EEA.  It is important to note that the BCEA was passed before the 
                                                          
156Dictionary reference www.disctionary.reference.com accessed on17 December 2014. 
157 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
158 Section 31(1) of the Constitution. 
159 Section 3 of the EEA. 
160 Section 1 of the EEA. 
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EEA. It may therefore be argued that legislature noticed the absence of the definition of FRL in 
the BCEA and then incorporated it in the EEA. This is doubtful since the BCEA was recently 
amended with no change in the categorisation/classification of instances when the leave may be 
taken. Had the legislature observed some deficiency in the provision of FRL, then the 
amendments would have been an opportune time to rectify this.  
 
It may be argued that due to the supremacy of the EEA with regard to the BCEA, definition, it 
was not necessary to include definition in the amendments. This, however, does not help the 
parties to the employment relationship who place reliance on the provisions of the BCEA. 
Failure to do this suggests that, despite the provision in the Constitution, the EEA and other 
relevant legislation, together with a shift in the general definition of family, the legislature still 




Another piece of legislation dealing with discrimination, PEPUDA,161 gives effect to sections 9 
and 23 of the Constitution. Similar to the EEA, it eliminates and prohibits unfair discrimination 
and promotes equality amongst others. It applies to employees who are not covered by the 
EEA.162 Since it applies to employees not covered by the EEA, it must by implication apply to 
those employees excluded by the BCEA.163 PEPUDA was enacted sometime after the EEA with 
the teachings of and establishment of jurisprudence from the Courts relating to discrimination.164 
As Deane opines,165 an interpretation of the EEA by the courts requires consideration of 
PEPUDA. This is because when PEPUDA was enacted, the Constitutional Court had already 
decided on numerous discrimination disputes some of which had arose from provisions of the 
EEA. Legislature would have had the opportunity to consider the shortfalls of the EEA and other 
legislation and correct them through PEPUDA. 
                                                          
161 Act 4 of 2000. 
162 Section 5(3) of PEPUDA. 
163 The BCEA in Section 1 exclude from its application member of the State Security Agency and unpaid volunteers. 
164T Deane ‘The Regulation of Affirmative Action and Discrimination in South Africa’ Chapter 6 in Affirmative 
Action: a Comparative Study LLD Thesis (2005) UNISA 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2012/07chapter6.pdf accessed on 26 December 2014. 
165 Ibid. 
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Although PEPUDA does not apply in instances where the EEA is applicable, consideration of 
sections/clauses similar to those in the EEA would assist in arriving at a more reasonable 
alternatively fair decision. In defining family responsibility, PEPUDA does not confine itself to 
the concept of immediate family.166 It defines family responsibility as a responsibility to a 
spouse, partner, dependant, child and other members of the family in respect of whom a person is 
liable for care and support.167Ultimately, an interpretation of the term ‘family responsibility’ 
must be in line with PEPUDA which clearly provide a broader definition of the concept. This is 
informed by the influence of jurisprudence in the drafting of PEPUDA 
 
While acknowledging the provision of FR and the definition thereof as set out in the EEA i.e. 
that which takes cognisance of immediate family, employers place heavy reliance on the 
provisions FRL in the BCEA and in this respect may not take cognisance of the EEA 
definition.168 The danger of the reliance on the provisions of section 27 of the BCEA was 
apparent in Public Servants Association obo Jonase169 where the arbitrator relied on the BCEA 
provisions whilst disregarding the employer’s employment policy.  Accordingly, the arbitrator 
disregarded the employee’s cultural practices despite the fact that the policy required that due 
regard be given to the employee’s cultural responsibilities. A similar conclusion was arrived at in 
the Fairy Tales Boutique.170Both of these decisions will be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
The provisions of FRL set out in the BCEA were also considered by Jackson171 who stated that 
FRL may not be claimed for any other reason than those set out in section 27 of the BCEA. He 
relied on the entitlement to leave as set out in this section, i.e. the restrictive and narrow 
provision.Notwithstanding the breath of this definition, the entitlement of family responsibility 
leave conferred by the BCEA172 seems to be narrowing the meaning of immediate family as set 
                                                          
166 Section 1 of PEPUDA. 
167Ibid. 
168NMMU ‘Transformation, Monitoring and Evaluation’ http://tme.nmmu.ac.za/Gender-Equity/Definitionsaccessed 
on 14 November 2013. 
169Jonase (note 2 above). 
170Fairy Tales Boutique (note 3 above). 
171 D Jackson ‘Everything you need to know about leave’www.Rowlay.co.za/home/Articl/everything-you-need-to-
know-about-leave Accessed on 14 November 2013. 
172 Section 27(2) of the BCEA. 
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out in the EEA173. The provision excludes some members of the African family structure 
creating disparity in the workplace. This results because the most employers rely on it as a 
condition of employment despite section 49 of the BCEA providing for variations. 
 
Section 49 of the BCEA provides as follows:   
 
“Variation by agreement 
(1)  A collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council may alter, replace or exclude 
any basic condition of employment if the collective agreement is consistent with the 
purpose of this Act and the collective agreement does not- 
(a) reduce the protection afforded to employees by sections 7, 9 and any regulation 
made in terms of section 13; 
(b) reduce the protection afforded to employees who perform night work in terms of 
section 17 (3) and (4); 
  (c) reduce an employee’s annual leave in terms of section 20 to less than two weeks; 
  (d) reduce an employee’s entitlement to maternity leave in terms of section 25; 
  (e) reduce an employee’s entitlement to sick leave in terms of sections 22 to 24; 
  (f) conflict with the provisions of Chapter Six. 
(2)  A collective agreement, other than an agreement contemplated in subsection (1), may 
replace or exclude a basic condition of employment, to the extent permitted by this Act or 
a sectoral determination. 
(3)  An employer and an employee may agree to replace or exclude a basic condition of 
employment to the extent permitted by this Act or a sectoral determination. 
(4)  No provision in this Act or a sectoral determination may be interpreted as permitting- 
(a) a contract of employment or agreement between an employer and an employee 
contrary to the provisions of a collective agreement; 
(b) a collective agreement contrary to the provisions of a collective agreement 





                                                          
173 Section 1 of the EEA. 




After a review of legal documents referred to above, the definition offered by PEPUDA appears 
to be more appropriate and accommodating, taking into account international and regional 
instruments ratified or adopted by South Africa, the South African Constitution and the diverse 
nature of the country. PEPUDA has a higher status than Acts of Parliament generally since 
section 9(5) of the Constitution mandated Parliament to enact anti-discrimination legislation.  It 
could be said that the EEA, as anti-discrimination legislation in the workplace has a similar 
status, but was not mandated by the drafters of the Constitution. Although the definition in the 
EEA is wide, it is open to different interpretations and may be confusing since what may be 
immediate family in one culture may not be in another and the EEA did not define the concept of 
immediate family. 
 
Despite the weight which is carried by PEPUDA in dealing with discrimination cases, it appears 
that must consideration has not been afforded to it. This probably because in its own provisions, 
it excludes it application in cases/instances where the EEA is applicable. In view of the fact that 
it was passed following numerous decisions from the Constitutional Court, legislators would 
have been better informed at the time of its passing to improve of some of the shortfalls in the 
EEA. It is therefore imperative that when considering discrimination disputes in the workplace 
including in those instances where the EEA applies that PEPUDA be afforded cognisance. This 
study, confirms the influence of jurisprudence since there is a marked difference in the definition 
of family responsibility. PEPUDA being compliant with international, Regional and National 
instruments together with decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
 
As the purpose of the study is to investigate the existence of discrimination related to cultural 
practice, Chapter 4 which follows from this chapter considers relevant discrimination laws in 
South Africa and how the Courts have applied them in respect of cultural and religious matter. A 
more comprehensive analysis appears in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER4:  




The question which arises is whether the definition of family responsibility as provided in the 
South African legislative documents is inconsistent with the African cultural definition of family 
responsibility and if so, whether such violation amounts to discrimination.  To understand the 
application of the concept of FRL and determine whether there has been a breach of the 
provisions of the Constitution, it is imperative to give consideration to the concept of 
discrimination.  A brief study of the concept of discrimination is also necessary since the purpose 
of this study is amongst others to establish whether the concept of FRL as embodied in the 
provisions of section 27 of the BCEA are discriminatory in nature. The following section 
describes discrimination and studies instances when discrimination is said to arise. 
 
4.2 The International Labour Organisation 
 
In its preamble, the Convention 156174 recognises the right of ‘all humans’ to pursue their well-
being and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and 
equal opportunity.175 The objective of the Convention 156 is to deal with issues of discrimination 
in employment and occupation which were not expressly covered by the 1958 Convention 
relating to family responsibilities and to supplement the standards. The objective was to further 
review the terms of the Employment (Women with Family Responsibilities) Recommendation, 
1965, and consider the changes since its adoption. 
 
The Convention recognises the problems of workers with family responsibilities as aspects of 
wider issues regarding the family and society which have to be considered in national policies 
                                                          
174 ILO Convention, Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156). 
175ILO Convention 156 further acknowledges the Equal Remuneration Convention and Recommendation, 1951, the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention and Recommendation, 1958, and Part VIII of the Human 
Resources Development Recommendation, 1975. 
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and the need to create equal opportunities and treatment between male and female employees 
with family responsibilities and other workers. It also noted that in the workplace, employees 
with family responsibility face aggravated problems which need improvement.176 In view of this, 
it was necessary to adopt certain proposals to create equal opportunities and equal treatment for 
men and women workers with family responsibilities.177 
 
Article 1 of Convention 156178 applies to men and women workers with responsibilities in 
relation to their dependent children, where such responsibilities restrict their possibilities of 
preparing for, entering, participating in or advancing in economic activity. The provisions of this 
Convention similarly apply to men and women workers with responsibilities in relation to other 
members of their immediate family who clearly need their care or support.179  It can be noted that 
the emphasis is on the ‘immediate’ family.  It must be acknowledged that the move towards 
including family responsibility was of course spurred on by the feminist movement and as a 
result, the emphasis was on equality between the sexes, to the neglect of cultural ramifications of 
family responsibility. 
 
4.3 South African Discrimination law 
 
Section 9180 of the Constitution provides for the right to equality and sets out this right as 
including the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. It further prohibits unfair 
discrimination whether direct or indirect against any of enumerated grounds including culture.181 
In this regard, it provides for national legislation to be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. Such legislation includes the EEA and PEPUDA amongst others. Discrimination 
on one or more of the listed grounds is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is 
fair. 
 
                                                          
176Preamble or particular provision of 156 Convention 
177Preamble or particular provision of 156 Convention. 
178Ibid. 
179Ibid. 
180 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
181The listed grounds further include race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
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From the Preamble and from section 9 of the Constitution182, it is clear that the right to equality 
is central to and inseparable from other rights. It is of fundamental importance to the 
restructuring of the South African society183 and guarantees that freedom will be enjoyed equally 
by all the people. In giving a more mature interpretation of the Constitution, little purpose, if any, 
is served by creating a hierarchy of rights or an absolute assertion that of a particular right than 
other rights. The importance of a particular right will be determined by the context within which 
it is claimed.184 
 
The Constitutional Court in Brink v Kitshoff185 has accepted that if the treatment complained of 
was substantially or materially based on the prohibited ground, then discrimination will be 
established irrespective of the presence of the non-prohibited considerations.186 Once the onus is 
discharged, it shifts to the employer to prove the fairness of the employment policy and practice.  
 
Section 23(1) the Constitution confers the right to fair labour practices as already discussed 
earlier. As stated above, the purpose of the BCEA is to give effect to, realise and regulate the 
right to fair labour practices conferred by section 23(1) of the Constitution.187 It is therefore 
expected that the provisions of the BCEA must be fair in their application and must safeguard the 
rights conferred by the Constitution. They must therefore not differentiate between employees as 
this amount to discrimination. Fair labour practices require that employees are treated equally 
while their diverse cultures are recognised. In view of the narrow classification of the family 
structure in the conference of FRL, equal treatment would not be realised.  
 
The EEA is the cornerstone of understanding unfair discrimination in South African 
workplace.188 The equality and non-discrimination aimed at by the EEA is consonant with our 
                                                          
182The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
183 Govender K and Bernard R ‘To exempt or not to exempt – Some Lesson for Educators and Administrators’ 
(2009) 30(1) Obiter 4. 
184Ibid 3. 
185Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC). 
186 T Cohen and L Dancaster ‘Flexible Working Arrangements for employees with Family Responsibilities – The 
Failings of the Employment Equity Act’ O Dupper and C Garbes (eds) Equality in the Workplace Reflections from 
South Africa and Beyond 1st ed (2009) Juta 209. 
187 Section 2 of the BCEA. 
188 O Dupper and C Garbers ‘The Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’ in Essential Employment Discrimination 
Law  E Strydom (ed) (2004) Juta 31. 
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Constitution’s vision of a concept of equality, which in the words of Moseneke J in Minister of 
Finance & another v Van Heerden189 includes “a credible and abiding process of reparation for 
past exclusion, dispossession and indignity within the discipline of our Constitutional 
framework”. 
 
Chapter II of the EEA deals with prohibition of unfair discrimination. Section 5 requires every 
employer to take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
discrimination in any employment policy or practice. The concept of employment policies and 
practice is defined in section 1 of the EEA as including, but is not limited to remuneration, 
employment benefits and terms and conditions of employment. 
 
The existence of discrimination in employment policies and practices is problematic to prove.  
On a purely semantic level, reference to policy or practice seems wider than the phrase 
requirement or condition. The definition in section 1 eases the burden on applicants by grouping 
the various policies and practices under one heading. All the applicant needs to show is that the 
policy or practice has a disproportionate effect on a protected group i.e. even if the individual 
factors are capable of separation, the employee can argue that the entire system has a 
disproportionate impact on several listed grounds.190Since family responsibility and culture are 
both listed grounds the disproportionate impact on any one of these grounds would result in 
direct discrimination and would therefore be unfair. 
 
In order to establish cultural discrimination, it is incumbent on the employees to show that 
through the enforcement of the policy, the employer interfered with their participation in or 
practice or expression of their culture. An intention to discriminate need not necessarily be 
present; the impact of the discriminatory practice is decisive. The practice must impact on the 
dignity of the affected individual, who must be a member of a group deemed worthy of 
protection191 for it to be discriminatory.   
 
                                                          
189Minister of Finance & another v Van Heerden (2004) 25 ILJ 1593 (CC) 1193D. 
190Dupper et al (note 188 above) 56-57. 
191 J Grogan ‘Workplace Law’ 10th ed (2009) Juta 95. 
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In Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd & others192 it 
was alleged that the company practised direct and indirect discrimination on racial grounds. A 
dispute regarding an alleged unfair labour practice was referred to the Labour Court in terms of 
item 2(1)(a) of schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 1995.193 The Court found that the 
failure of the employer to pay the same contribution to the pension and the provident fund as it 
did to the staff benefit fund discriminated against members. The Court found further that the 
monthly/weekly paid criterion was arbitrary and therefore discriminatory in terms of item 2(1)(c) 
of schedule 7 to the LRA. It found that the notion of permissible discrimination is in keeping 
with a substantive, rather than a formal approach to equality that permeates the Constitution of 
1996 and from which item 2(1)(a) draws its inspiration.194 
 
The Court stated that discrimination is unfair if it is reprehensible in terms of the society’s 
prevailing norms. Whether or not society will tolerate the discrimination depends on what the 
object is of the discrimination and the means used to achieve it.195 The object must be legitimate 
and the means proportional and rational.196 The Court accordingly found that the employer’s 
interpretation and application of the rules of the retirement benefit funds involved unfair 
discrimination on arbitrary grounds on the basis of race. The employer also unfairly 
discriminated against its Black employees by making them weekly paid and by not requiring or 
inviting Black monthly paid employees to join the staff benefit fund.197 
 
Section 6 mirrors the prohibition of unfair discrimination as provided in the Constitution. The 
EEA however includes additional grounds. It prohibits unfair discrimination against an 
employee, in any employment policy or practice, on several grounds including family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, and culture among others.198The 
prohibition may however be justified through affirmative action or inherent requirements of a 
job.199 
                                                          
192Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd & others (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC). 
193 The provisions of item 2(1) of schedule 7 have been repealed and appear in exactly the same form in the EEA. 
194Leonard Dingler (note 192 above) 294. 
195Leonard Dingler (note 192 above) 301. 
196Leonard Dingler (note 192 above) 301. 
197Leonard Dingler (note 192 above) 301. 
198 Section 6(1) of the EEA. 
199 Section 6(2) of the EEA. 
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In Woolworths v Whitehead200 which related to discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy, 
Willis JA held that the decision of the employer in regard to a single employee could hardly be 
described as a policy or practice. The court found that the requirement of policy and practice laid 
down in Section 6(1) of the EEA was not met.  Dupper201 states that there are at least two 
problems with this approach - the first being that it seems to suggest that a prejudicial attitude is 
a requirement in our law which is not the case. Secondly, the implication of this approach is that 
an employer will be able to reject all female applicants for employment as long as each decision 
is taken separately. This would defeat the purpose of the legislation.  
 
The approach by the court in the Woolworths decision does not give a clear guideline on what 
would constitute a workplace policy or practice. The categorisation in the EEA202 appears broad 
especially since it includes workplace practices. In order for an employee to succeed in a 
discrimination dispute, they would have to show the existence of a workplace policy or practice.  
 
In Leonard Dingler203 the Court surveyed the provisions of the EEA and the Constitution and 
came to the conclusion that the onus rested on the employer to show that the object of the 
practice or policy was legitimate and that the means used to achieve it was rational and 
proportional. The Court came to the conclusion that, once the applicant established that there was 
discrimination, the evidentiary burden shifted to the employer to show that there was no unfair 
discrimination.   
 
As stated above, section 6(1) of the EEA prohibits direct or indirect unfair discrimination of 
employees on several grounds including FR and culture. Direct discrimination refers to situations 
in which some people are treated differently from others on the basis of a listed ground or on 
arbitrary grounds. Indirect discrimination is where an employer utilises an employment policy or 
practice which appears neutral but disproportionately affects members of disadvantaged groups 
                                                          
200Woolworths v Whitehead (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC) 579. 
201Dupper (note 188 above) 57. 
202 Section 1 of the EEA. 
203Leonard Dingler (note 192 above). 
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in circumstances where it is not justifiable204as in the Jonase decision which will be discussed in 
chapter 5.205 If an employee is successful in linking differentiation with a listed ground, it is not 
only discrimination but discrimination is presumed to be unfair.206 
 
4.4 Cultural Practices 
 
Culture refers to the way of life of a specific group.207 It is not static but changes with 
generations. It includes rituals, norms of behaviour religion etc. Culture is the set of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group.208 It 
encompasses value systems, traditions and beliefs ways of living together and lifestyle. South 
Africa is made up of diverse cultures209 and African culture is one of them. 
 
Culture is born with or learnt. Cultural practices in South Africa include how we behave, talk 
pray and the special things we do when we have births and deaths. The definition is not 
exhaustive.210 As appears from the definition of FR and FRL, the main focus of this study is 
influenced by cultural practices. Further reference to the topic will be dealt with under 
prohibitions of unfair discriminations under the EEA below. 
 
This study would be incomplete if the right to cultural practices was not considered. It is only 
necessary to illustrate the importance of this right. Before 1994, the white minority held power in 
South Africa and as part of foregoing such powers required for minority rights to be catered for 
in the final constitution.211 This resulted in the right to equality and the right to cultural, religious 
and linguistic communities being recognised. Culture is amongst the grounds of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in the Constitution.212 
 
                                                          
204Dupper (note 188 above) 39. 
205Jonase (note 2above). 
206Dupper (note 188 above) 38. 
207 SA History ‘Defining culture, heritage and identity’ www.Sahistory.org.za. 
208United Nations Educational, scientific and cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Education Report 2000 ‘The 
right to Education for all through life; www.unesco.org/education/information/wer/ accessed 31 December 2014. 
209SA History (note 207 above). 
210 SA History (note 207 above). 
211 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5thed (2005) Juta 622. 
212 Section 9(3) of the Constitution.  
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The Constitution in section 31 provides that persons belonging to a cultural, religious or 
linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to 
enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language, and to form, join and maintain 
cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. 
 
The right to cultural practice is based on article 27 of the ICCPR. Article 27 of the Convention 
protects the right of minorities to use their own culture, although an individual right, can only be 
enjoyed when shared with a group. The protection accorded in article 27 is similar to that in 
section 31 of the South African Constitution. According to Currie, it expresses culture of a 
communal object and a means of expressing values and tradition. 213 He states further that one’s 
right to participate in cultural life will be impugned if some harm comes to the cultural 
community in which the individual belongs. The right protects both individual and group interest 
which makes the scope of the protection to serve a dual purpose - for example inMEC for 
Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Naveneethum Pillay.214In that case, a school disciplinary code that 
prohibited the wearing of cultural and religious dress (a nose ring) was found to be 
discriminatory and the court recognised both the individual and group right attaching to her right 
to practice her culture. However, where the interest of the community restricts individual 
participation into that community, then these interests may conflict. 
 
The Constitution does not list FR as a prohibited ground of discrimination. It however lists 
culture as one such ground. Clearly recognised cultural beliefs can be assessed and evaluated. A 
cultural practice is enjoyed in association with other people. The greater the number of people 
that engage in the practice, the more likely it is to be genuinely held.215 Several cases have been 
decided in favour of cultural rights. In the Pillay216decision, the Court held that the voluntariness 
or otherwise of the cultural practice is irrelevant to the determination of whether it qualifies for 
protection. 
 
                                                          
213Currie et al (note 211 above) 624. 
214MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v NaveneethumPillay2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 67. 
215Govender et al (note 183 above) 7. 
2162008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at par 67. 
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An exercise of the cultural right may not be in conflict with other fundamental rights. A stated by 
Currie, the Bill of Rights mainly affords individual rights.217 The protection of group rights must 
conform with and be placed in context with the rights aimed at guaranteeing’ individual freedom 
and equality. The right to culture is of course one of the rights protected in the equality section of 
the Bill of Rights.218 In entertaining and interpreting any claim to cultural practice, one must 
ensure that it does not encroach upon other individual rights.  
 
FR and culture are listed grounds in terms of the EEA,219 therefore if an employee is able to 
show the differentiation in terms of these grounds, then it will be presumed that the employee is 
discriminated against. The onus then shifts to the employer to try and justify the 
discrimination.220 Reasonable accommodation is always an important factor in determining the 
fairness of the discrimination,221 however, the Court in the Pillay decision cautioned against 
reducing fairness to reasonableness.222 
 
The EEA223 defines reasonable accommodation as meaning any modification or adjustment to a 
job or working environment to enable a person from a designated group to have access to or 
participate or advance in employment. While in the Code of Good Practice224 reasonable 
accommodation is defined as providing an enabling environment for disabled workers and 
workers with family responsibilities to allow them to participate fully and improve productivity.  
 
The case of POPCRU225and Kievits226 referred to below set out examples of instances where 
employers were expected to reasonably accommodate employees. 
 
                                                          
217Currie (note 211 above) 623-624. 
218 Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
219 Section 6(1) of the EEA. 
220Dupper (note 188 above) 38. 
221 Govender et al (note 215 above) 8. 
222Pillay (note 214) para 77. 
223Section 1 of the EEA 
224 Code of Good Practice: Preparation, Implementationand Monitoring of Employment Equity Plans, Published 
under GN R1394 in Government Gazette 20626 of 23 November 1999. 
225POPCRU (note 263 below). 
226Kiewits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi and others(2014) 35 ILJ 406(SCA). 
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In the same year as the Pillay decision, in a decision dealing with the test for reviews in the 
Constitutional Court, the Court moved from the fairness of the decision to reasonableness.227 It is 
likely that a similar approach may be followed in dealing with discrimination cases arising in the 
workplace.The Constitutional Court has however created confusion on the test to be followed 
since in a recent decision,228 Judges held different views by finding on the one hand that fairness 
and justifiability applied and on the other that fairness as a standard could not be sourced in the 
EEA as to do so would be to undermine section 9(2) of the Constitution. Instead of creating 
clarity, the Constitutional Court has left the issue more confusing to lower courts. 
 
Diversity should be accommodated when there is a conflict between rights and applicable 
rules/laws. 229 Balancing the conflicting rights becomes an option when the employer can 
establish that the employee’s demands would create an undue hardship. It is at this point that it 
becomes justifiable to search for a compromise position that does not impose undue hardship and 
does not unjustly limit the employee’s rights.230 
 
The matter of Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi& others231 that culminated in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal decision that will be considered below, started as an arbitration 
proceeding in the CCMA, then was reviewed by the Labour Court,232and was heard by the 
Labour Appeal Court233  before ending at the SCA. 
 
The employee, Mmoledi was employed as chef de partie at the applicant’s country estate. She 
sought permission to take unpaid leave of absence from for a month in order to complete a 
course to become a traditional healer, a calling, but her request was refused. She went on leave 
without permission. On her return she was charged with several act of misconduct including 
gross insubordination, absence without leave for more than 3 days without authorisation and 
non-compliance with managerial instructions. She was found guilty and dismissed for being 
                                                          
227Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC). 
228South African Police Service v Solidarity OBO Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC). 
229Govender and Barnard (note above) 9. 
230Ibid. 
231Kiewits (note 226 above) 
232Kiewits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others (2011) 32 ILJ 923 (LC). 
233Kiewits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi and others (2012) 33 ILJ 2812 (LAC). 
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absent for more than three days without authorisation. She then referred an unfair dismissal 
dispute to the CCMA.  
 
The court stated that the case was a sad example of what happened when cultures clash in the 
workplace since the employer was concerned about making money at all costs and the employee 
believed that her ancestors were calling her to become a sangoma. When the employer did not 
regard the calling to be a sangoma as an illness, the employee did.234 Ironically, when the 
employee first informed the employer of the visions she was having, she was allowed to work in 
the morning and attend her trainings to become a sangoma in the afternoon235. In this instance, 
the employer had balanced two conflicting rights and accommodated the employee reasonably. 
 
The ultimate question to be decided by the court was whether her absence from work was 
justifiable. The factors considered by the court in this respect were: the reason for the absence, 
the duration, the employee's employment record, and the employer's treatment of such offences 
in the past. The onus rested on the employee to tender a reasonable explanation for her absence 
and in this instance, the commissioner found that while she had breached the employer’s rule, 
this was justified.236   
 
After considering the test for review, the court found the award to have been well reasoned and 
dismissed the application with costs.237 
 
On appeal before the Labour Appeal Court ‘the LAC’, it was noted that the chairperson of the 
disciplinary enquiry noted the explanation tendered by the employee for her absence was firstly 
to undergo the sangoma training and graduation alternatively that she was ill since spirits of her 
forefathers were bothering her. The chairperson could not accept that an employee would attend 
unrelated courses with no economic benefit to the employer on company time. In respect of the 
sickness, he found that she had not provided a letter by a medical practitioner as required by the 
                                                          
234 Kievits (note 232 above) para 22. 
235 Kievits (note 232 above) para 23. 
236 Kievits (note 232 above) para 26. 
237 Kievits (note 232 above) para 28-30. 
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BCEA to prove the alleged illness. As a result, the chairperson rejected explanations and 
recommended the sanction of dismissal.238   
 
In the Labour Appeal Court, the appellant argued that the Labour Court should have found that 
the commissioner committed misconduct and arrived at a decision which a reasonable decision 
maker would not reach when finding that the employee had an excuse valid in law for her to be 
absent for several weeks without leave to attend a sangoma course; it argued that there court 
erred in several respect by failing to find that when enacting the LRA and the BCEA the 
legislature opted for standards more akin to western standards than to African culture, examples 
of which were section 23(1) and 23(2) of the BCEA; failing to find that the commissioner 
assumed the function of the legislature elevating the role of traditional healers to medical 
practitioners; failing to find that the commissioner disregarded decisions stating that a certificate 
issued by a traditional healer was not a proper certificate to be seriously considered when 
determining an employee’s reasons for absence; failing to find that the effect of the award would 
open the floodgates to malpractices turning the work environment into total disarray, contrary to 
labour legislation by allowing employees who believe in and subscribe to the African traditions 
and culture to diagnose themselves as suffering from some disorder or illness and then expect 
employers to be bullied into accepting sick notes from traditional healers on the same footing as 
medical certificates for unspecified periods of absence.239 
 
The LAC, per Tlaletsi J240 noted that it was unfortunate that much emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the employee claimed to be sick and that the certificate from her traditional healer was 
not valid as required by section 23 of the BCEA.241 This was because she was not sick or ill in 
the conventional sense and her case was that, based on her cultural and/or traditional belief, she 
had to undergo sessions to qualify her to be a sangoma as she obtained a calling from her 
ancestors. The employer understood this initially and when she first took time off, he 
accommodated her without asking whether she was sick in the conventional sense and required 
                                                          
238 Kiewits (note 233 above) para 11. 
239 Kiewits (note 233 above) para 18. 
240Ndlovu JA and Murphy AJA concurred in the judgment of Tlaletsi JA. 
241Kiewits (note 233 above) para 22. 
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no medical certificate.242 The problem only arose when the employee required a full month to 
conclude her sangoma sessions and it was found that she did not have sufficient leave days. The 
employer took the view that she could only be accommodated if she produced a “medical 
certificate” as proof of her “medical condition”. In an attempt to comply with this requirement, 
the employee obtained a certificate from her traditional healer that she was treating her for her 
‘condition’.243 
 
In the LAC’s view, section 23 of the BCEA found no application. The employee was not seeking 
remuneration for the period when she would be away due to ill health; she wished to be 
accommodated by being given a month’s unpaid leave to complete a process she had already 
begun. The Court found that the employer’s argument that by enacting section 23 the legislature 
expressly opted for standards in line with Western standards as opposed to African culture was 
misplaced and the Commissioner had not usurped the functions of the legislature by elevating the 
role of traditional healers to that of medical practitioners.244 
 
The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that the Commissioner’s findings would open 
the ‘floodgates’ to malpractices in the workplace.245 The Constitution recognises traditional 
beliefs and practices and some of them are strongly held by those who subscribe to them and 
regard them as part of their lives. Those who do not subscribe to others’ cultural beliefs should 
not trivialise them. What is required is reasonable accommodation of each other to ensure 
harmony and to achieve a united society.246 This is supported by Jordaan in his analysis of the 
decision.247 
 
In the SCA, the appellant argued that the Commissioner committed a gross irregularity within 
the meaning of section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 by misconceiving 
the true nature of the inquiry in that he asked the incorrect question, i.e. whether the respondent 
                                                          
242Kiewits (note 233 above) para 23. 
243Kiewits (note 233 above) para 24 
244Kiewits (note 233 above) para 25. 
245Kiewits (note 233 above para 26 
246Kiewits (note 233 above) para 26. 
247Jordaan (note 31 above); A Rycroft ‘Accommodating religious or cultural beliefs in the workplace: Kiewits Kroon 
Country Estate v CCMA; Dlamini v Green Four Security; POPCRU v Department of Correctional Services’ (2011) 
23 SA Merc LJ 106-113. 
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was justified in notreporting for work.248  Further, that the commissioner failed to appreciate the 
true nature of the inquiry, i.e. whether or not the appellant had properly applied the principles 
applicable to a request for unpaid leave. Had he done so, the appellant submitted, the 
commissioner would have concluded that the dismissal was substantively fair.249 
 
The SCA, per Cachalia J250found it apparent from the employee’s evidence, both at the 
disciplinary hearing and before the CCMA, that she believed that she was ill.251 Her employer 
seemed to have understood that her experiences bore some cultural significance, but he did not 
understand this as some form of illness.252 The chairman of the disciplinary enquiry also did not 
accept that she was ill without proof from a medical practitioner. In contrast the commissioner 
accepted that the employee genuinely believed that she was ill, and that her belief stemmed from 
deeply held cultural convictions.253 
 
The SCA found it to be beyond dispute that such belief systems are part of the culture of 
significant sections of the country’s people. The courts had acknowledged this. Also beyond 
dispute, the SCA held, was that as part of these belief systems people resort to traditional healers 
for their physical, spiritual and emotional well-being.254 After reference to the findings of the 
World Health Organization on the issue, the court noted that in contrast to the approach of 
conventional medicine, which uses ‘material causation’ to treat illness, traditional medicine 
generally looks towards the ‘spiritual’ origin, which includes communication with the 
ancestors.255 
 
In the court’s view, South African courts are equipped to deal with disputes arising from 
conventional medicine which are governed by objective standards, whereas religious doctrine or 
cultural practices are not.256 They are not permitted to evaluate the acceptability, logic, 
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consistency or comprehensibility of such beliefs, and are concerned only with the sincerity of the 
adherent’s belief and whether it was being invoked for an ulterior purpose. 
 
Once the commissioner correctly found that the employee’s beliefs were sincere he was required 
to determine whether her failure to obey the employer’s instruction was justified or 
reasonable.257 The court rejected the employer’s contention that the employee had not been 
honest in relying on the certificate, and noted that had the employer understood the certificate to 
be equivalent to a medical certificate, or tried to understand its import, it might have 
accommodated her request.258 The court was satisfied that the commissioner’s conclusion that 
the employee was justified in disobeying the employer’s instruction was supported by the 
evidence and dismissed the appeal with costs.259 
 
Rycroft J, in commenting on this case, argues that a key principle to be taken from this case is 
the following: 
 
“[W]here an employee, giving adequate notice to the employer of thecircumstances and reasons, 
finds that it is a necessity (to the point that it isbeyond control) not to render services because of 
religious or cultural beliefs, it may be unreasonable to dismiss the employee where unauthorised 
leave istaken because of those beliefs.”260 
 
Because the respondent requested unpaid leave, the LAC did not consider the application of 
section 23 of the BCEA.  At the time of the judgment, and currently, traditional healers are not 
yet regulated.  The lack of regulation creates a legal vacuum, as Phooko and Mnyongani argues, 
which requires urgent attention.261  Similarly, Chenia has argued that the recognition of 
Traditional Healers as health care practitioners in the Traditional Health Care Act of 27 of 2008, 
and the establishment and implementation of regulations of the Traditional Healers Practitioners 
Interim Council signals the protection of the social and cultural diversity in South Africa.In the 
                                                          
257Kiewits (note 226 above) para 28. 
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259Kiewits (note 226 above) para 32. 
260A Rycroft (note 247 above). 
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Page | 72 
 
workplace, she argues, the establishment of the council may settle “the issue of certificatesissued 
by THPs” and obviate “the need for the constitutionalchallenge to the BCEA”, thus providing 
more clarity for the employers as to their obligations in accommodating religious and cultural 
diversity.262 
 
In POPCRU v Department of Correctional Services263, five male correctional officers were 
employed by the respondent. Whilst in the respondent’s employment, they wore dreadlocks. In 
2007, the Area Commissioner issued instructions on the dress code which included hairstyles. 
Employees were requested correctional officers to furnish reasons why they should not be 
disciplined for noncompliance.  All but the five employees complied with the instruction and cut 
their hair. Of the five employees, two advanced cultural reasons/practices relating to their 
training as traditional healers, as the reason for wearing dreadlocks. They were to shave off their 
hair on completing the training they were undergoing.  The other three provided a reason that 
they wore dreadlocks for religious purposes being that they were Rastafarians.  
 
When the employees were disciplined, they raised a defence that female employees were allowed 
to wear dreadlocks. They argued that the policy of the respondent was not in line with the 
Constitution of South Africa because it contained elements of discrimination. In response to the 
suggestion that correctional officers smuggled drugs into the correctional centre, it was stated 
that the respondent’s employees were subject to random searches. The evidence of the union in 
support of the dismissed employee was that there had never been a case of Rastafarian charged 
for smuggling drug. Further that the rule in respect of the wearing of dreadlocks was not 
consistently applied with reference being made to other employee at regional and head office.  
Evidence was also led from a traditional healer who testified as to the rituals which had to be 
performed in respect of the calling.  
 
The respondent’s case was that there had been lack of discipline and dagga was a drug of choice 
at the facility. Evidence was led of several deviations from other policies including the leave 
policy, vehicle use policy and smoking policy. Employees were expected to execute all 
                                                          
262M Chenia‘Traditional healers and sick leave’ (September 2013) Without Prejudice18-19, 18. 
263POPCRU v Department of Correctional Services (2010) 31 ILJ 2433(LC). 
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instruction which were in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution. The respondent 
refuted any allegations of inconsistency and led evidence to the contrary.    
 
After considering the evidence and the provisions of section 6 of the EEA, the Court found that 
the applicants had been treated differently to female colleagues and therefore that their claim for 
discrimination was a direct one based on gender.264 The court found further that the second 
instance of discrimination relied on by the applicants was indirect and related to the respondent’s 
use of an employment practice in the form of an instruction to remove dreadlocks which 
appeared neutral but affected members of disadvantaged groups disproportionately without 
justification.265 The court found that it was not the applicant’s case that they were directly 
prohibited from their Rastafarian and/or cultural belief.266 In instances of indirect discrimination, 
the onus was on the applicants to prove the existence of discrimination. Once this is done, 
discrimination will be presumed unfair until the respondent proves otherwise.267 
 
The Court accepted that the applicant employees kept their dreadlocks for religious and cultural 
reasons.268 After considering several Constitutional Court decisions, the court stated that the 
employees had never brought to the respondent’s attention that the instruction issued by the 
employer was in conflict with their religious and cultural practices.269 The employees knew their 
rights to religious and cultural practices but failed to assert them at a critical time. 270 The Court 
found that the employees failed to prove direct discrimination in respect of right to religion and 
cultural practices. They had the onus to prove that their belief was a ‘sine qua non’ for their 
dismissal.271 In view of this, the Court found that the presumption of unfairness was negated by 
the failure of the employees to assert their right.272 
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Having considered the provisions of section 9(1) and (2) of the Constitution, the Court found that 
the employees were discriminated against on the basis of gender since there were insufficient 
reasons advanced as to the differential treatment between male and female employees.273 Further, 
that there was no evidence to sustain an argument that Rastafarian correctional officers were 
likely to be manipulated by prisoners for purposes of sneaking in drugs. 274 
 
On appeal275, the Labour Appeal Court stated that in determining whether employees have been 
unfairly discriminated, on the listed grounds, in the context of a dismissal, it must be proven that 
there was differentiation between employees or groups of employees ‘which impose a burden or 
disadvantage or withholds benefit, opportunities or advantages from certain employees’ on one 
or more of the prohibited grounds.276  The court found further that the employees wore their 
dreadlocks for religious and cultural beliefs. In considering equality or religious/cultural 
freedom, the authenticity of the belief is irrelevant. Consideration is to be given to whether the 
belief is sincere and made in good faith.277  The court found the decision of the Labour Court that 
there was no religious or cultural discrimination ‘erroneous’. It found that the failure to assert the 
rights did not render discriminatory action non-discriminatory.278 If found that the discrimination 
relating to culture and religion was direct.279 The court found that there was an overlap between 
gender and religious/cultural beliefs. It then had to determine whether such discrimination was 
fair.280 
 
The court accepted the application of the normal applicable determinant of fairness under the 
EEA and PEPUDA to the LRA.281 The test for fairness is: 
 
“the nature and extent of the limitation of the Respondent’s rights; the impact of the 
discrimination on the complainants; the social position of the complainants; whether the 
discrimination impairs the dignity of the complainants; whether the discrimination has a 
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legitimate purpose and whether reasonable steps have been taken to accommodate diversity 
sought to be advanced and protected by the principle of non-discrimination.”282 
 
In exercising the test, the court had to consider the obligation of the state as the employer to 
accommodate diversity by evaluating the impairment of dignity, if any, to the employees, its 
impact and whether a lesser restrictive and prejudicial way existed to achieve the purpose. The 
court held that ‘there must be a rational and proportional relationship between the measure and 
the purpose it seeks to achieve. Reasonable accommodation of diversity is an exercise of 
proportionality bearing upon the rationality of the means of achieving the legitimate purpose of 
the prohibition’.283 
 
It found that the refusal was justifiable to address the issue of discipline amongst the officers and 
for security reason in light of their duties. The court set the test for limiting the rights as 
including amongst others, whether reasonable steps have been taken to reasonably accommodate 
the diversity sought to be advanced and protected by the principle of non-discrimination.  The 
court was required to determine the obligations placed on organs of state to accommodate 
diversity. In doing this, the court took into account the impairment of dignity, the impact and 
whether there is a less restrictive and less disadvantageous means of achieving the purpose.284 
 
The LAC noted dicta by the Constitutional Court to reasonably accommodate matters of 
culture.285 Employers should therefore not burden religious and cultural believers on their choice 
at the expense of respecting the authority and prerogative of their employers.286 The LAC found 
that it must be proved that wearing short hair was an inherent requirement of the job which the 
employer had failed to prove.287 The LAC found that the employees had been discriminated upon 
on the basis of religion/culture and race.288 
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On a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA),289 the court noted that the 
employer’s case was changed to being that the discrimination was justifiable since it was 
intended at eliminating security risk placed arising from placing employees which subscribed to 
a religion or culture which promotes criminality in the form of dagga in control of a quasi-
military institution in the form of a prison. In view of this, it was argued that the employer’s 
problem was no longer with the hairstyle.290 Dreadlocks were said to render Rastafari Officials 
conspicuous and susceptible to manipulation for inmates of their faith and other inmates to 
smuggle dagga.291 The distinction between males and females was said to be because it was 
usual for women to wear long hair.292 
 
The court stated that the already established dicta that “once discrimination has been established 
on a listed ground, unfairness is presumed”.293 The onus shifts to the employer to prove the 
contrary. The court will consider the position of the victim in society, the purpose sought to be 
achieved by the discrimination, the extent to which the discrimination has affected the victim’s 
rights, whether the victim’s human rights were impaired and the existence of a less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose of the discrimination. The court found that the policy degraded and 
devalued followers of the religion and cultural practices and was a substantial invasion of their 
dignity saying that their religion and culture were unworthy of protection.294 
 
Dismissal could be fair if it was based on the inherent requirements of a job being an essential 
and indispensable attribute relating to an inescapable way of performing a job.295 The court held 
that it was not established that short hair and not dreadlocks was an inherent requirement of the 
job. Further that a policy restricting religious and cultural belief where such did not detract or 
jeopardise the employee’s performance of his duties or public safety or cause undue hardship to 
the employer was not justifiable.  There was no rational connection between the purported 
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purpose of discrimination and the measure taken nor was an unreasonable burden on the 
employer established. The appeal was therefore dismissed.296 
 
McGregor has listed a number of principles to be deduced from a decade of employment law 
cases on accommodation of the right to religion and these may find application for 
accommodation of cultural understanding of family in FRL as well.297  For example: 
 
(xii) It is important for an employer to take reasonable steps to accommodate diversity, which is 





South Africa is made up of diverse cultures as discussed above. In recognition of this diversity 
and to protect cultural practices, the section 31 of the Constitution was included in the Bill of 
Rights. Culture relates to the way of life by a specific group. The concept is wide and includes 
value system, traditions, beliefs, ways of living together and lifestyle.  Culture influences 
behaviour, communication and how a community deals with births and deaths. Article 27 of the 
ICCPR was incorporated in the Bill of Rights and protects the rights of minorities to enjoy their 
own culture. 
 
Although the right to cultural practice is an individual right, in order to be enjoyed, one must 
belong to a group. The protection of cultural rights must not encroach upon other individual 
rights. Culture is a listed ground in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. Therefore 
discrimination on the basis of culture is presumed to be unfair. The Courts have held that in 
considering cultural freedom, the authenticity of the belief is irrelevant. Consideration must be 
given on whether the belief is sincerely held and made in good faith. The onus would then shift 
to the employer to justify the discrimination. One of the justifications that the employer can rely 
on is to prove that it is the inherent requirements of a job i.e. the indispensable attribute linked to 
the inescapable way of performing a job. 
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The Constitutional Court has set out dicta for employers to reasonable accommodate matter of 
culture. Reasonable accommodation must be exercised proportionately taking into account the 
rationality of the means to achieve a legitimate purpose of the prohibition. Reasonable 
accommodation must not cause undue hardship on the employer. 
 
According to the Labour Appeal Court, the failure to assert one’s rights does not render what 
would ordinarily be discriminatory non-discriminatory. The test set by the Labour Appeal Court 
to determine unfair discrimination on a listed ground. As set out in Chapter 2, the definition of 
family and consequent responsibilities in the African tradition are much wider that the Western 
definition. The definition of family in the African culture includes in laws and other persons 
involved in raising members of the family. In view of this certain obligations flow due to the 
nature of the relationship which must be protected as envisaged by the Constitution.  
 
The Employer’s argument in the Kiewits decision echoes the essence of this paper since it was to 
the effect that the legislature in enacting the BCEA followed Western culture and tradition. 
Although this issue was not specifically addressed by the Court, the fat that the Court found that 
the employer had an obligation to accommodate the employee in that case confirms the 
reasonable accommodation approach adopted by the Court in both the Kiewits and the POPCRU 
decisions at the LAC and the SCA. In POPCRU, the Court emphasised the fact that employers 
may not burden religious and cultural believers on their choice at the expense of respecting 
authority and the employer’s prerogative.  
 
The SCA in POPCRU took the matter a further finding that the policy degraded and devalued the 
religious and cultural employees and that it was an invasion of their dignity suggesting that their 
religion and culture were unworthy of protection.  
 
The Family responsibilities carried by African employees set out in Chapter 2 flow from 
belonging in a particular group and is established as a cultural practice. As a result and in view of 
cases discussed in this chapter, this is protected by the Constitution. The provisions of Section 27 
of the BCEA clearly exclude the African definition/classification of family and therefore limits 
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persons for whom FRL may be awarded to the Western nuclear definition. The result is that 
employers complying with the provisions of the BCEA fail to consider diversity and/or cultural 
practices. This is the case despite the BCEA providing for deviations. This appears in the 
Kiewits decision although that case dealt with sick and annual leave and not with FRL.  
Discrimination on the narrow classification of FRL constitutes discrimination of the basis of 
culture and therefore unfair. 
 
This chapter focussed more on the application of discrimination laws and court decisions without 
considering the court’s application of cases specifically relating to FRL. Chapter 5 which is the 
next chapter considers decisions specifically relating to FRL and the link if any to discrimination 
cases. Although some analysis appears in this chapter, a further and fuller analysis appears in 
chapter 6 of this paper. 
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Chapter 5:  
 




The judgments considered hereinafter deal specifically with the interpretation and application of 
various legislation by the Courts and other statutory dispute resolution mechanisms/institutions 
in dealing with issues relating to FRL. The FRL entitlement sets out in the BCEA fails to take 
cognisance of the provisions of section 9 of the Constitution read with section 31 together with 
the provisions of section 6 of the EEA which prohibit unfair discrimination on the basis of 
culture. Five decisions will be discussed. 
 
5.2. Masondo decision 
 
In Masondo v Crossway298  the employee was employed to clean, cook and serve customers 
between 7:00 to 16:30. During September 1996, she went on maternity leave and returned on 1 
February 1997. During early April she was instructed to work night shift starting from 13:00 to 
21:00. Since she had a new born baby, she considered this impossible and as a result resigned 
from employment on 15 April. She referred a constructive dismissal dispute to the CCMA and 
also alleged that the employer had unfairly discriminated against her in terms of gender and 
family responsibility and sought compensation. Although the allegation of unfair discrimination 
fell outside the jurisdiction of the CCMA, the parties consented to it being arbitrated.299 
 
The commissioner found it intolerable to expect the mother of a newborn child to work night 
shift and that the employee had satisfied the onus in terms of section 192(1) of the LRA. The 
commissioner found further that the employer had failed to show that there were compelling 
reasons for choosing the employee to work the night shift. The employer’s case was that the ‘just 
refused to work’ claiming that she could have changed shifts or made alternative arrangements. 
                                                          
298Masondo v Crossway (1998) 19 ILJ 171 (CCMA). 
299In terms of section 141(1) of the LRA. 
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It was conceded that alternatives had never been canvassed with the employee. During the end of 
his cross-examination Mr de Sousa, the employer’s witness, admitted that the employee’s request 
to work the day shift was not unreasonable. Having considered this and other evidence, the 
Commissioner found the dismissal unfair.300 
 
In terms of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, where unfair discrimination is proven, the dismissal is 
automatically unfair. The Commissioner found that there was a lack of jurisprudence in South 
Africa on the on the interpretation of ‘family responsibility’ and relied on ILO Convention 156 
(to which South Africa is a signatory) which aims to ensure equal treatment of all sexes and 
prohibit discrimination of the basis of family responsibility.301 Reliance was also placed on other 
jurisdictions, including the USA, Canada and the United Kingdom.302The commissioner 
considered international and foreign jurisdiction required for all measures to be taken to enable 
workers with family responsibility exercise their right to free choice of employment and 
classifies as invalid termination of employment on the basis of family responsibility.303 Notably, 
the Commissioner found that the language used in the Convention 156 was too wide to provide 
sufficient guidance.304 
 
It is trite law that an employee need not prove the employer’s intention to discriminate and must 
simply show the disparate impact of the employer’s practice on minorities and women. Once this 
is done, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the practice was established through 
business necessity by showing that these relate to the successful performance of the job in 
question. The Commissioner accepted the test as being the removal of artificial, arbitrary and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when these barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of impermissible classification.305 
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The commissioner found that by requiring the employee to work night shift despite her family 
responsibility the respondent discriminated against the employee.306 This was irrespective of the 
employer’s intention. The finding was based on the fact that another employee without children 
was not asked to work night shift and that no other employee with newly born children was 
asked to work the night shift.307 He found that the selection of the applicant employee was for 
personal preference and not a business necessity. The requirement caused disadvantage since the 
employee was being deprived of the opportunity to raise her child in the best circumstances 
available.308 
 
The Commissioner stated that it could be argued that the discrimination was indirect since the 
treatment was neutral on the face of it but had a discriminatory impact on the employee.309 This 
was based on the fact that requiring an employee to work night shift could be regarded as 
reasonable but this would not be so where the requirement relates of a mother of a newly born 
child. The Commissioner found that the employee succeeded in establishing a prima facie case 
of discrimination on the basis of family responsibility; consequently, he found that the employer 
had failed to establish the required defence that placing the employee on night shift related to a 
business necessity.310 
  
While foreign jurisdiction has a persuasive value only, in view of a lack of South African 
decisions on the matter, foreign authority would become highly persuasive.  The dismissal was 
found to have been automatically unfair and the employee awarded 12 months’ salary as 
compensation.311 This case did not deal with discrimination relating to family responsibility 
associated to cultural practices, but it clearly displayed in taking decisions affecting employees in 
the workplace, their family responsibilities must be considered. The decision must be a 
reasonable one accommodating such a responsibility especially in light of the Constitution, the 
provisions of the BCEA and international instruments. The Commissioner found that there was 
little if any help from the international instruments. 
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5.3. Cooperative Workers Association decision  
 
The Labour Court Co-operative Workers Association & another v Petroleum Oil & Gas Co-
operative of SA & others312 per Pillay J considered a case in respect of FRL relating to 
discrimination. This case however did not deal with cultural issues. The case involved a 
discrimination claim brought by a trade union, Independent Employees Association (IDEA). 
During or about 2003, the respondent, Petro SA, was formed following a merger of several 
organisations. A collective agreement was thereafter concluded at the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and arbitration (the CCMA) between Petro SA and several trade unions 
which standardised terms and conditions of employment. One of the terms related to the actual 
cost of the employees’ medical aid which was consolidated into the employees’ total guaranteed 
remuneration (TGR). The effect was that employees with dependent spouses and children 
benefited significantly more since the TGR of employees with family responsibilities increased 
substantially.  
 
Most of the members of (IDEA), a minority trade union constituting only 2.5% of the workforce 
had no family responsibilities. These members had no quarrel with this but objectedto the 
inadvertent consequences of consolidating the medical aid contributions into the TGR. This was 
because the calculation of other benefits was based on the TGR.  
 
Employees with family responsibilities received greater benefits. IDEA contended that the 
differentiation based on family responsibility amounted to unfair and unjust discrimination 
which violated the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.313 After 
considering arguments on several preliminary points raised by the respondents, the court was 
satisfied that the matter was properly before it in terms of the EEA314 and dismissed the 
objections.315 
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IDEA referred to a two stage test for unfair discrimination developed in Harksen v Lane.316 It 
argued that the remuneration policy adversely affected single and unmarried employees with no 
dependants and affected their dignity as they were financially not valued the same as employees 
with dependants.317 The Labour Court stated that since family responsibility was a listed ground, 
fairness is presumed.318 The pejorative element of the differentiation is that unequal treatment is 
based on personal attributes and characteristics. The measure affected the interest of employees 
in their professional lives. A negotiated outcome was not a defence to discrimination and an 
assessment of unfairness is based on its impact to the person allegedly discriminated on.319 
 
IDEA argued that the employer had shown that it differentiated and that this amounted to 
discrimination. Further that even if this was for commercial reasons, these did not outweigh the 
discrimination against employees without dependants.320 
 
The court examined international instruments dealing with the value of the family and the need 
to protect workers with family responsibilities as a vulnerable category of people.321 It also 
considered the Constitutional Court’s emphasis on the important status of the family in several of 
its decisions,322 that the EEA definition of ‘family responsibility’ is similar to that of the ILO;323 
and that the EEA protects workers with family responsibilities as a disadvantaged category who 
must be reasonably accommodated.324 Further, the court considered that a measure challenged as 
violating the principle of equality would be valid if it promoted the achievement of equality and 
was designed to protect and advance the disadvantaged against unfair discrimination.325 The 
court also referred to articles 16(1) and (3) and 23 of the United Nation Declaration of Human 
Rights, article 16 of the European Social Charter 1996, article 5 of the Convention 111 
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Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation Convention of 1958 and 
Recommendation 123 of 1965 on Employment and concluded that they were pertinent. Although 
the court relied and was guided by the principles in the international instrument, it did not deal 
with the status of these instruments in South African law. However, the fact that the court relied 
on them can only mean that they are applicable. 
 
The employer’s argument was that the EEA reinforced the aim to protect workers with family 
responsibility as a disadvantaged group by declaring its purpose to achieve equality in the 
workplace.326 It indicated that it was common cause that South African courts pursued 
substantive equality.327The court concluded that special measures are applied to workers with 
family responsibilities to adjust for the hardships of such responsibilities since in the absence of 
an affirmation of their special status, there can be no equality amongst the workforce.328 
 
The court found that paying more to employees with dependants was not a reward for 
performance nor an accolade for special achievement but a legal and moral response to the social 
needs of a vulnerable group of employees.329 Further that having dependants had no impact on 
their intrinsic value and dignity as human beings i.e. that their remuneration, based on the 
number of dependants, could not impact on their dignity. 330 The court compared the impact of 
the differentiation on the dignity of employees without family responsibilities with that of a 
municipality levying higher utility charges on property owners in areas that were predominantly 
white as decided by the Constitutional Court in Pretoria City Council decision.331 
 
The court found that the collective agreement did not discriminate unfairly and that there was 
therefore no need to intervene.332 It further found that intervention would also be unwise as it 
would upset the balance struck by the bargaining partners in the course of the merger.333  The 
union’s members had not been disadvantaged when compared to their position prior to the 
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merger. Any attempt to remove benefits which employees had prior to the merger purely for the 
sake of achieving formal equality would be unlawful and counterproductive to the purpose of 
collective bargaining to secure the best deal for a greater number of the workforce.334 
 
The court found that more employees benefited from the new remuneration scheme and the 
union could not advance a more credible formula or method of calculating remuneration.335 The 
court accordingly dismissed the claim and ordered IDEA to pay 30% of Petrol SA’s legal 
costs.The judge found that in determining the matter, persons with family responsibility were 
categorised as a vulnerable group which required protection hence the protection in the 
Constitution, the EEA and the international instruments. In arriving at this decision, a distinction 
was made between formal and substantive equality. The judge correctly pointed out that South 
Africa applied substantive equality to redress the imbalances and protect vulnerable groups.  
 
The case was referred as a discrimination dispute relating to family responsibility. The court 
accepted that family responsibility was a listed ground and therefore discrimination on this 
ground was unfair. The court considered definitions of FRL as appears in several international 
instruments and noted that workers with FRL were a special group which deserved protection. 
Applying the principle of substantive equality, it found that workers without family 
responsibility were not discriminated against. The Court found it to be ‘pertinent’. The court 
made no did not consider the classification of FRL as appears in the BCEA or consider the link, 
if any, of the definition in the BCEA to that in the international instruments.  
 
The international instruments classifies workers with FRL as a special group deserving 
protection which is similar to the protection afforded to cultural practices i.e. person exercising 
this right are a protected minority. Therefore workers with seeking to exercise their FRL on the 
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5.4.  Public Servants Association on behalf of Jonase decision 
 
Public Servants Association on behalf of Jonase and Department of Justice & Constitutional 
Development336, dealt with an application of the concept of family responsibility leave relating to 
cultural definition of family in the public service sector. The applicant (the employee) was 
employed by the respondent as the Deputy State Attorney. The employee applied for three days’ 
family responsibility leave in terms of Resolution 7 of 2000, a collective agreement regulating 
leave in the public service following the death of his brother-in-law. He understood the leave to 
have been granted initially but was subsequently advised that it was rejected and the three leave 
days debited with from his three days’ vacation leave. He referred a dispute to arbitration in 
terms of section 24 of the LRA for the interpretation and application of the Resolution 7 of 2000 
read with clause 7.7.3 of the Public Service Leave policy. 
 
The employee claimed that by Xhosa customary law his brother-in-law was regarded as a full 
member of his family and that he was therefore entitled to family responsibility leave in terms of 
clause 22.4 of the Resolution read with the Public Service Leave Policy. The employee’s leave 
application was recommended by his supervisor and according to him approved by the HOD. He 
claimed that this applied equally to the interpretation of section 27(2) of the BCEA.337 He 
contended that the respondent failed to execute its duty with due care considering ‘the 
employee’s cultural responsibilities’ and/or failed to afford him the opportunity to make a proper 
representation/motivation in this regard. He sought for an order reversing the decision taken by 
the respondent.338 
 
It was contended for the applicant that the Resolution was vague in the sense that the provisions 
are silent on the question whether a direct family member/immediate family member includes 
natural members and/or family members by operation of law, by marriage (custom/civil) and 
thus also includes brothers-/sisters-in-law.339 According to the argument, the provisions should 
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be interpreted broadly to include a ‘sibling’ as brother-/sister-in-law. 340 The arbitrator stated that 
in questions like this, the general principle to be applied was to give meaning in the 
ordinary/literal sense.  
 
Having recorded the evidence and argument from both parties, the arbitrator noted that clause 
22.4 defined ‘immediate family’ for the purposes of family responsibility leave as ‘parent, 
adoptive parent, grandparent, child, adopted child, grandchild or sibling’. He stated that if the 
drafters had intended to include other members by operation of law they would have expressly 
stated so.341 Notably, the BCEA, being the statutory source informing the collective agreement 
did not proffer the definition of family responsibility leave.  
 
The applicant further contended that the Resolution required that in the granting of family 
responsibility leave due consideration of the employee’s cultural responsibilities must be taken 
and that the respondent failed to consider this properly.342 The arbitrator stated that the 
Resolution allowed for leave in respect of immediate family and that if the parties to the 
agreement intended to include members by operation of law, they would have stated so 
explicitly.343 The provision in the Resolution was thus narrowly tailored. The arbitrator found 
that it did not make sense to apply a wider definition. He asked where the line would be drawn if 
the definition was to be extended “by operation of law (marriage/and possible separation)” and 
concluded that extending the definition would interfere with that line.344 
 
The Respondent relied on the pre-constitutional case law345 that indicates a ‘brother-in-law’ is 
not per se part of the “immediate family”.346It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the 
applicant was seeking the Bargaining Council to step into the shoes of the parties to the 
collective agreement and offer an alternative definition of immediate family who may benefit 
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from the definition.347 The arbitrator indicated that this was instead an issue which should be 
addressed at the negotiating table. 
 
The arbitrator did not accept that it was the responsibility of the respondent to approach the 
employee to enquire whether the leave application contained cultural issues.348 Lastly, it 
appeared that the application for leave had never initially been approved. The arbitrator found 
that the applicant was not entitled to family responsibility leave in terms of the Resolution in 
circumstances of a non-direct/immediate family member (e.g. brother-/sister-in-law) with no 
order as to costs.349 
 
The arbitrator limited himself to the ‘supremacy’ of the Collective agreement and did not 
consider other definitions available beyond this.350The dispute was referred as an interpretation 
and application of a collective agreement. The arbitrator was therefore required to do no more 
than merely accepting the definition of immediate family provided in the collective agreement. 
The arbitrator’s decision was clearly influenced by the classification provided by the BCEA 
being the law that provided for FRL.  
 
The collective agreement to be interpreted in this case was a clear example of the reliance placed 
by employers on the provisions of the BCEA. This is because even in defining immediate family, 
the parties limited the definition to the BCEA classification despite the existence of other 
legislation suggesting a wider definition. This case demonstrates the need for a clearer 
classification by the BCEA. 
 
While section 39(2) of the Constitution enjoins courts and relevant tribunals and forums to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, the arbitrator failed to do so. If he 
had done this, he would have had to take cognisance of the protection afforded to the right to 
culture in the Bill of Rights. He also failed to take into account the definitions in the EEA and 
PEPUDA. The arbitrator’s failure to consider relevant legislation led him to arrive at an incorrect 
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decision. If relevant legislation was taken into account, the arbitrator would have accepted the 
employee’s argument that the definition of “immediate family” was wider that suggested by the 
collective agreement with the result that the concept of FRL was wider that stated in that 
agreement. He would have accepted taking into account the African culture that in laws are 
members of a family.  
 
5.5.  Mogorosi decision 
 
In Mogorosi v SA Reserve Bank,351 a decision regarding an alleged constructive dismissal, the 
applicant was unhappy with amongst others, the level of empathy shown to him when his mother 
died. He testified that his manager did not express condolences and that the respondent granted 
him only the three days’ compulsory family responsibility leave when other persons were given 
up to a maximum of seven days’ leave. The Commissioner found there was insufficient evidence 
regarding condolences.352 He found further that the employee had failed to show why he should 
get more leave days than the family responsibility leave provided for in the BCEA.353 
 
The Commissioner found that there was no evidence of the type of leave other persons had taken 
or that the applicant had applied for additional leave. 354Having considered this and other factors, 
the Commissioner found that the employee had failed to prove that the employer had conducted 
itself in a manner which rendered the continuation of the employment relationship intolerable.355 
The application was dismissed with costs.  
 
The decision deals with alleged dismissal for constructive dismissal. The issue of family 
responsibility was raised as one of the issues to prove that the employee was treated in a manner 
which made continued relationship intolerable. The employee in this instance argued that when 
he had to attend his mother’s funeral, he was not afforded more days like other employees and 
this showed that he was treated in an accommodating manner as compared to other employees.  
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This case is a clear display of the confusion caused by the definition proffered in the BCEA. 
Even trained Commissioners find themselves bound by the provisions of the BCEA and do not 
consider the provisions of section 49 which allow for a deviation.  It also shows the expectation 
that workers with FRL have on their employer when their ‘loved ones’ pass away. It exemplified 
the inconsistency on the part of the employer when granting FRL as other employees were given 
days in excess of the BCEA while the Applicant was not.  
 
5.6.  Fairy Tales Boutique decision 
 
Fairy Tales Boutique t/a Baby City Centurion v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration and Others356 was another decision where the court considered the issue of family 
responsibility leave. The issue came before court as a review in respect of a dismissal and not a 
discrimination dispute. The court did not therefore consider whether the refusal of FRL would 
amount to an unfair dismissal. An illustration of how the matter was decided is however 
necessary to display how the court dealt with the matter.  
 
The applicant sought a review in the Labour Court for the review and setting aside of a rescission 
ruling and an arbitration award issued under the auspices of the CCMA. The rescission 
application is irrelevant for purposes of this study and will therefore not be dealt with. The facts 
of the case were briefly that the third respondent Winnie Sitholewas employed by the applicant 
as a cashier. Her mother-in-law passed away and she approached her immediate superior 
requesting for leave to arrange the funeral. The request was denied on the basis that she had 
exhausted her family responsibility leave and that in terms of the BCEA, family responsibility 
did not extend to parents-in-law. She was therefore required to be present at work and participate 
in the stock take which was scheduled for that weekend. 
 
The third respondent informed the superior that she would not be at work for a few days despite 
the refusal of her leave request. She had been responsible for the care of her mother-in-law and 
proceeded to make arrangements for the funeral and also conducted post funeral rituals on 
Sunday. When she returned to work on Monday she was issued a notice for a disciplinary 
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hearing and was following the hearing dismissed for gross insubordination. She had some history 
of ill-discipline, the last and valid one being a final written warning in respect of late 
coming.Following the dismissal, the third respondent referred a dispute to the CCMA and was 
awarded compensation.   
 
After considering the evidence led, the Commissioner rejected evidence that the third respondent 
was dismissed for disobeying instructions, and noted that employees are entitled to disregard an 
unreasonable instruction.357 This would be the case where there was a family emergency. In this 
case, the Commissioner found that the applicant was required by her custom to make 
arrangements associated with the funeral: 
 
“This was particularly so in circumstances where ‘there was a family emergency and the 
applicant was needed, according to her custom, to make the myriad of arrangements associated 
with an African funeral.’”358 
 
The Commissioner concluded that the dismissal was in fact for taking unauthorised leave and 
found that the third respondent’s conduct was justifiable as she was the one primarily responsible 
to make funeral arrangements.359 While the third respondent’s family responsibility leave was 
exhausted, the Commissioner found that there was nothing preventing the respondent from 
allowing her to take annual or unpaid leave.360 
 
The Commissioner found it unreasonable for the applicant to reject the third respondent’s leave 
despite the explanation from her husband. She also found that the applicant would not have been 
inconvenienced with the stocktaking since employees from other stores were there to assist and 
the third respondent had timeously made her request which allowed the applicant to make 
arrangements for further assistance. It was found further that the applicant’s displayed a “callous 
disregard for the cultural practices of black employees and the family circumstances of the 
Applicant” (the third respondent in the Labour Court).361 The commissioner found that the 
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applicant had considered the applicant’s disciplinary record dismissal was inappropriate and 
unfair under the circumstances.362 In view of the fact that the applicant had failed to ensure that 
the third respondent was represented, her dismissal was found to have been both substantively 
and procedurally unfair. 363 
 
Although the commissioner made no specific reference to the Constitution or the EEA, she 
applied the principled contained in the two statutes. She took into account the employee’s right 
to culture and then found that the employer should have taken steps to reasonably accommodate 
the employee be allowing her to take annual leave or unpaid leave in the place of FRL. Finally, 
she found that the employer would not have been inconvenienced by the employee’s absence. 
 
Bhoola J, in the Labour Court, found that the Commissioner’s award met the requirements of 
reasonableness and in view of that found it was not reviewable.364The court held that the 
Commissioner was justified in finding that the applicant should have made attempts to 
accommodate the needs of the third respondent and a failure to do so amounted to a callous 
disregard for her personal circumstances.365 It was never suggested that the request for leave was 
disingenuous or an abuse of the applicant’s sick leave and the submission that she was 
indispensable at the stock take was unsubstantiated. The review was dismissed with costs.366 
 
While the matter did not directly deal with discrimination relating to family responsibility leave 
but was rather related to dismissal, the court confirmed the Commissioner’s finding that the 
dismissal related to family responsibility leave. Both the Commissioner and the judge found the 
employer’s conduct in refusing the employee family responsibility leave and then dismissing her 
when she absented herself from work unreasonable. They also found that there was a duty on the 
employer to accommodate the employee. 
 
According to the Labour Court, the employer had an obligation to reasonably accommodate the 
employee. This confirmed the commissioner’s award to the extent that the employee should have 
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been allowed to utilise her annual leave to fulfil her family responsibility alternatively be 
allowed to take unpaid leave.367 In doing so, although not specifically spelt out, the judge 
enforced the protection afforded to the employee by the EEA. Further, the fact that both the 
Commissioner and the Court found that she was responsible for her mother-in law despite the 
provisions of the BCEA extends the definition/classification of family as provided for in the 




There appears to be no case which has dealt with all aspects of this study being discrimination in 
respect of cultural practices relating to family responsibility leave in the workplace.  
 
What appears from the cases discussed, particularly those considered ‘discrimination’ cases368is 
that the courts and CCMA,  in addition to considering South African legislation, also considered 
international instruments and in some instances international and foreign law. This was because 
of the lack of jurisprudence in South African law dealing with discrimination in respect of FRL. 
Notably, while some decisions found that the provision of FRL in the international instruments 
were not helpful, others found them to be of assistance. It was accepted in these decisions that 
FRL was a listed ground and therefore a prohibited ground of discrimination. Cognisance was 
taken of the protection afforded by the EEA to persons with FRL as a vulnerable group. What 
clearly came out is the fact that in dealing with discrimination cases, it must always be 
recognised that South Africa applied substantive equality to redress the imbalances of the past. In 
view of that, employers are expected to accommodate employees with FRL unless the inherent 
requirements of a job do not permit such accommodation. In these cases the definition of FRL 
was not considered as this was not an issue. 
 
However, in cases which were not discrimination cases per se,369 it was only in rare instances 
that decision considered applicable legislation. The courts found themselves bound by the 
provisions of the BCEA and other applicable documents which did not take into account the 
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provisions of the Constitution and other relevant legislation. These cases dealt with the 
classification of FRL. Reliance was clearly based on the available classification without 
questioning its meaning or constitutionality. Consideration of the Constitution and other relevant 
legislation would have revealed that the classification was narrow and failed to take into account 
African culture and tradition. Acceptance of existing classification led to outcomes which were 
discriminatory in nature.  
 
The difference between Jonase370 and Fairy Tales Boutique371 decisions is factually that in 
Jonase372 the leave was required for attending the funeral of a brother-in-law on the basis that in 
terms of custom that person is now a ‘member of the family’, whilst in Fairy Tales the leave was 
requested because she was actually responsible for the day-to-day care of her mother-in-law, in 
other words, she was a ‘dependent’ in the usual sense. The FR obligation arising in both 
instances is due to cultural obligations and values that arise from a broader definition of family. 
 
In one case, the classification in the BCEA was disregarded in favour of the right to cultural 
practice, the duty to reasonably accommodate employees with FRL and a consideration of the 
possible inconvenience which could result in accommodating employees.373 A wider 
classification of FRL was applied by the Commissioner and confirmed by the Labour Court 
which resulted in a reasonable decision being arrived at. 
 
What appears from the cases is that in most instances, despite the requirement by section 39 of 
the Constitution, decision makers disregard the provisions of the Constitution and other relevant 
legislation while relying on other legislation which conflicts with the spirit and purport of the 
Constitution thereby arriving at decisions which are constitutionally unsound. In the absence of 
clarity in those statutes, people in the workplace will continue to suffer prejudice and be 
discriminated against.    
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It is not what we understand by the definition of family but the responsibilities associated with 
the definition in terms of the cultural. Since South Africa follows substantive equality, people are 
not treated the same hence the requirement/need to accommodate diversity. 
 
In chapter 6, earlier chapters are analysed to arrive at the recommendations and conclusions. 




Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapters provide information on the definitions of the concept family, the use of the 
concept in the South African legislative documents and a review of pertinent cases that have 
directly or indirectly been affected by the use of the concept.  This chapter analyses the 
information in line the objectives of this study, first by synthesising information from the 
previous chapters and then making explicit interpretations and submissions in that regard.  
Conclusions are then drawn, that lead to the recommendations. 
 
6.2  Family as it should be understood 
 
The research cited in this study reveal the concept family to be perceived as a social construct 
meant to explain relationships of people in terms of agreed upon norms of a given 
society/culture. Although different meanings are attached to the concept and this impacts on the 
ultimate responsibilities associated with it, a central definition is essential that will guide 
legislative documents, professionals, judicial officers, employers and employees.  Employers and 
employees, the groups who are of interest in this study, attach significance to the definition and 
guidance entailed in the legislative documents together with the meaning usable in explaining 
family responsibility in workplaces.  A clear understanding is crucial in the application of family 
responsibility leave, to enable employers to regulate the exercise of their discretion and for 
employees to adjust their leave requests.   
 
Scholars agree that a universally acceptable definition of the concept does not seem to exist374 
and advise that a broader definition that considers context in relation to culture(s) and trend(s) 
would be acceptable. In South Africa, the diversity of cultures is said to be further complicated 
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by ethnic differences although similarities of structure have been reported375 especially among 
Blacks (Africans). Thus, clarifications of the concept require explanation of cultural affiliation 
by the affected parties.  In this way, the cultural behaviour of the party defining it will not be 
overlooked.  The threat to [this ideology] is abuse by those who may extend clarifications 
beyond reality, in order to serve their needs.   
 
Some define the concept in terms of close blood relations that includes parents, children, aunts 
and cousins while others refer to a group of people who live together and operate as a single 
household or dependents of common ancestors.  Some dictionaries use the term “immediate 
family” to describe a close blood relationship arrangement, with some expanding the 
composition of the members beyond the popularly known nuclear family. The phrase 
“immediate family” is also used in the provisions of the EEA in the context of defining FRL 
without a definition being offered. When it is related to descriptions in the dictionaries, what is 
observable is as a set of relations usable able to be used to determine which members of a 
person’s family may be affected by rules within the term’s confines. There must therefore be a 
connection by blood, adoption, marriage, civil partnership, cohabitation, and step parents and 
children. Responsibilities associated with the family relate to amongst other compensation on 
death or being granted leave to attend a funeral.  
 
What becomes apparent in this study is that the Western culture and African culture define the 
concept of family differently. Because of colonisation, Western culture has influenced law 
making in the previously colonised countries including South Africa. The influence may result in 
an unintended outcome and may in some instances be discriminatory.  
 
As explained in chapter 2, sociologists have formulated what is called the process theory to 
explain the evolution of a family. In the 19th century in Western culture, family evolved from an 
extended nuclear family to just two generations.  Responsibilities were limited to procreation, 
raising children affection, companionship and sharing economic resources. In the 21st century, 
the era of the post-modern (post-industrial) theory, family declined from being a social 
institution to that which provided emotional support. The decline altered the family composition 
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further. Urbanisation was the influencing factor. Literature reveals that other factors which 
played a role were acceptability of divorce, working mothers, step parenting, single parenting 
and out of wedlock births. Despite the changes, the Western definition still confine the 
classification of family members to blood or legally obtained relations such as in the form of 
adoption. The decline has also resulted in institutions performing the roles and functions 
traditionally performed by families.  
 
This Western definition is viewed by Tembo376 as undermining the African tradition. 
Researchers are blamed for superimposing perceptions and practices from other countries in an 
attempt to understand the local situation, which created misconceptions about the African 
cultural practices. The Western definition is said to be too narrow to accommodate family forms 
in other cultures.  In recent years, grand-parents and other kin members provide the necessary 
care and supportand this makes the traditional nuclear families ill-suited for this era.  
 
The African classification of a family is that it is large, multigenerational and socially reinforcing 
and is said to be common among all Africans. Therefore a general African family includes a 
mother, father, children and relatives related by blood or marriage. Listed as belonging to such a 
family are uncles, aunts, polygamous mothers (who play the role of being other mothers and 
fathers) and their children. Accordingly, care and supported is expected from members of such 
family, which includes caring for widows, orphans and older generations.  
 
The list also includes other person not related by blood, who may have carried the responsibility 
of care and became psychologically attached to the child. This relationship, based on care 
(outside blood connections) is unique to Africans and has to be respected and acknowledged 
even in workplaces as an important cultural milestone.  It is this kind of relationship that may not 
be documented in the legislative literature, leading to unintended acts of discrimination.  Culture 
dictates that any member requiring care and assistance is the responsibility of the capable one.  
In the event of a death or a misfortune occurring, group responsibility and sharing in the sadness 
is expected from all persons classified by the family as members.  
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The distinction between the Western definition and the African definition is therefore that the 
West, mainly White people, restrict the concept too narrow while clearly appearing from the 
above, the African culture broadens it. When considering the African definition, the use of the 
phrase “immediate family” may become problematic. Similarly to other colonised African 
countries, South African families were influenced by industrialisation and policies of Apartheid. 
Among some of the influential factors are Christianity and the introduction of the migrant labour 
system and other factors introduced and compel Africans to conform to the concept of a nuclear 
family.  This resulted from the provision of small houses to the migrant labourer. 
 
There appeared an unfortunate and misleading perception that the only legitimate structure is that 
of a nuclear family and that other forms of family structure were regarded as wrong.377The 
oppressive idea that Western practices are the best diluted the African culture among some of the 
urbanised Africans, giving the Apartheid regime the wrong impression that their culture was 
applauded by Africans when in fact Africans had no choice at the time but to succumb to the 
prevailing situation. During the era, laws of the country would have understandably/expectedly 
taken the shape of the applicable force. Despite this, there was no indication that African families 
completely abandoned their traditional practices. It would therefore have been expected that laws 
which were passed after 1994 starting from the South African Constitution would consider all the 
necessary practices and would be aimed at addressing diversity and the imbalances of the past. 
This however does not appear to be clearly visible from a reading of the Constitution although 
group rights and individual rights are protected. 
 
Reference by Okon378 and Tembo379 to various family structures and patterns and suggest that 
the definition be based on functionality within society accommodates the African arrangement. 
The authors suggest a universally accepted definition of family that is inclusive of different 
cultures and historic periods. Although this inclusion could make it difficult to design legislative 
strategies, knowledge of the existing problem relating to the definition would be the right step. 
The marked resemblances in various cultures in South Africa,380 can help determine a general 
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broad outlined pattern of family which would be helpful in defining a family within the African 
context. The roles and responsibility of family members are that of a primary source of social 
support.  
 
For both blood and non-blood relatives to be accommodated, employers are expected to be 
considerate when dealing with applications for family responsibility leave, guided by the reasons 
provided by the employees. It is expected that employment laws would provide an all-
encompassing definition which allowed parties to clarify their relationships where such are not 
obvious. 
 
6.3  The influence of international and regional treaties 
 
Meanwhile, international instruments define family as a group/unit of society and recognise the 
need to protect if. Some go so far as accepting that it takes various forms influenced by culture, 
politics and social systems. South Africa ratified and adopted some of these instruments and 
must therefore comply with them. Compliance may mean alignment of government with the 
instruments’ definition of family. Incidentally, the definition in regional documents proffers a 
definition that resembles the international instruments. An analysis of these documents reveals 
that the concept of family is wide and is influenced by several factors. Interestingly, none of 
these documents have sought to classify members of the groups that make up a family and no 
mention is made of immediate or nuclear family as is done by sociologists or other sources such 
as dictionaries. 
 
6.4 Lessons from the South Africa jurisprudence, policy and legislation 
 
This study reveals that when the Commissioner, in the Masondo381 case attempted to use the 
international instruments, the ILO definition was too wide to provide any assistance. In the Co-
operative Workers Association case, on the other hand, the judge considered these instruments 
and others dealing with the concept of family responsibility read with the South African 
Constitution and found them to be helpful.  Subsequently to this observation, the judge found it 
                                                          
381Masondo (note 298 above). 
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necessary to protect the group with family responsibilities. The Court did this without the 
consideration of the definitions of family or family responsibility.  
 
While the Constitution of South Africa does not specifically deal with the concept of family, it 
can be read from the provisions of sections 9 and 31 (on analogous grounds) that this is a group 
that needs to be protected on the grounds of culture as it was read from the decision of the Co-
operative Worker’s Association.382 Therefore although no direct definition of family and family 
responsibility leave appear in the Constitution, unfair discrimination against this group is 
prohibited. The introduction of the BCEA, which was presented to deal with the concepts in 
South Africa would have brought about direction on how the family responsibility matters would 
be dealt with.  Unfortunately, little, if any consideration gave attention to the African culture in 
classifying family.  The BCEA acceded to the definition that responded to negative influences of 
colonisation, industrialisation and Apartheid and not on the resultant effects on this important 
social group. 
 
The Social Welfare White Paper383 aligns its definition of family to that stated by authors as an 
African definition384 both stating functionality of the ‘social unit’ as important although the 
White Paper adds economic factors to the equation. The elements of care, nurturing and 
socialisation are typical of family responsibilities in an African family. Interestingly, the White 
Paper was conceived simultaneous with the BCEA and yet no sign of alignment exists between 
the two.  Unfortunately, the White Paper does not classify members of the family and is thus not 
serving much purpose to this study. 
 
The problem with the BCEA is the restricted classification of family members to a nuclear type 
family when explaining the FRL. Instead of recognising the imbalances of the past and 
addressing diversity, the BCEA seem to perpetuate the oppression of the African Cultures by 
colonisation and Apartheid while promoting industrialisation. It continues to resonate the notion 
that legislation in South Africa is influenced by the ‘oppressors’ while there is a new government 
                                                          
382Co-operative Worker’s Association (note 312 above). 
383Social Welfare White Paper (note 116 above). 
384Okon (note 69 above) and Nzimande (note 23 above) 34. 
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system in place, denouncing the fact that it has as its objectives as the advancement of social 
justice and to give effect to the Constitution and the ILO. 
 
The neglect of culture negates the primary objectives of the BCEA stated by Du Toit385 and 
Basson386 as the provision of working conditions for unorganised and vulnerable workers. The 
introduction of the concept FRL serves this purpose amongst others. In the absence of cultural 
inclusivity and the narrow classification, the Commissioner in the Masondo387matter and the 
Court in the Co-operative Worker’s Association388 sought recourse from the international 
instrumentsin order to achieve fair labour practices as envisaged in section 23 of the 
Constitution. 
 
Application of the BCEA classification is traceable in organised areas such as sector Collective 
Agreements and workplaces to regulate the FRL, as appears in the Jonase389case, in which in-
laws were not classified as family. However, in the Fairy Tales Boutique390decision, the 
employer challenged the Commissioner’s decision which found that the classification extended 
to in-laws which finding was confirmed by the Labour Court on review.  The employer in this 
case inadvertently found themselves bound by the BCEA classification. The commissioner had 
found that the employer had a callous disregard for cultural practices. The legal consequences 
are a sign of an existing problem requiring urgent intervention strategies.  It is therefore crucial 
that the classification clearly echoes the essence of the Constitution. This is because even 
persons conferred with the powers and responsibilities of interpreting and applying labour 
legislations find themselves bound by the restrictive classification/categorisation set out in the 
BCEA.  
 
The introduction of the EEA was to bring about clarity on matters of discrimination in 
employment law, listing FRL and culture as a prohibited grounds of discrimination.  The EEA 
defines FRL as relating to “immediate family”, the concept of which sociologist avoided using 
                                                          
385 Du Toit et al (note 133 above) 533. 
386Basson et al (note 135 above) 288. 
387Masondo (note 298 above). 
388Co-operative Worker’s Association (note 312 above).  
389Jonase (note 2 above). 
390Fairy Tales Boutique (note 3 above). 
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and those using it warned against the conflicted interpretation it may introduce. Meanwhile, the 
EEA lists foster children as members of a family.  The definition obtained from the dictionary 
describes a foster child as ‘a child looked after temporarily or brought up by people other than its 
natural or adoptive parents’ without legally adopting a child’.391  If the description is accepted as 
accommodating non-blood parents, it is safe to say that the EEA definition encompass both the 
blood and the non-blood relatives and is therefore compliant with the African definition of 
family. Unfortunately, the EEA does not classify members of a family and therefore does not 
provide the necessary guidance on who qualifies for FRL. Considering that the BCEA is used to 
set out employment policies for most of the unorganised workplaces leaves its classification 
leaves much to be desired. 
 
In using the term immediate family, it can be argued that legislature’s intention was to introduce 
an all-encompassing phrase which allowed various interpretations. Considering the definition of 
“immediate family”, and regarding the prohibition of discrimination by the EEA, the ruling in 
the Jonase matter by the Commissioner is herewith regarded as unfair in that the exclusion of the 
in-laws is discriminatory.The phrase “immediate family” was included in this instance in a 
collective agreement. In this instance, the collective agreement must be applauded for taking 
cognisance of the provision of the EEA and deviating from the classification in the EEA. Other 
decisions did not interrogate the definition set out in the EEA but simply focused on the 
prohibition against unfair discrimination in the EEA.  
 
In recognition of the prohibition against unfair discrimination in the EEA, regard must also be 
had to the protection of cultural practices which emanates from the Constitution and carried out 
in the employment field through the EEA. Just like family being defined as a group, culture is a 
way of life of a specific group and evolves with generations. As already stated above, culture is 
one of the factors which influence the family form and function, encompassing traditions, beliefs 
and ways of living together. South Africa is made up of diverse cultures including the African 
culture. Furthermore, just like the influence that Apartheid had on family forms, it was 
recognised in the Constitution that the White minority had, during their time in government, used 
its powers to undermine African culture.  How this behaviour diffused into the new system of 
                                                          
391 Free Dictionary www.the freedictionary.com accessed on 17 December 2014 
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government to continue disregarding the African culture could not be established in this study.  
The right to cultural practices is therefore as protected as protection to minority rights. 
 
As appears from the Constitution and from international instruments, the right to cultural 
practices is an individual right which can only be enjoyed when shared with a group. The right 
therefore protects group and individual interests. The enjoyment of cultural practice may not be 
in conflict with other fundamental rights. In this study, the protection of FRL is in conjunction 
with that of culture. Therefore in respect of the rights protected by the EEA, employees with FR 
require understanding when seeking protection based on FRL and culture. An exercise of these 
rights in the workplace relates to the right to fair labour practices. Therefore, in the 
Kiewits392case, the court found that the employer’s argument was more inclined to Western 
standards as opposed to African culture. The provisions of the BCEA may therefore be 
misleading as far as fair labour practice in the workplace is concerned and is discriminatory.  
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination by the Constitution and the EEA is important and 
surpasses all workplace legislation on differentiation. According to international instruments, the 
introduction of FR in the workplace and the protection thereof was intended to create equal 
opportunities and equal treatment for workers with FR. In terms of the EEA, FRL and culture are 
among listed ground of prohibited discrimination. Therefore, discrimination of any one or more 
of the listed grounds is unfair unless the employer proves otherwise and established that it is 
fair.393 
 
With the present classification, the BCEA makes it difficult for employees to prove 
discrimination or that the policy has a disproportionate effect on a protected group. Once the 
employee establishes the existence of discrimination, the onus to prove that in the case of a 
workplace policy that the policy was legitimate and that the means to achieve it were rational. 
This was also applied in the POPCRU394 decision. In the Masondo395decision, the commissioner 
stated a well-established principle that it was not necessary for the employee to prove the 
                                                          
392Kiewits (note 233 above). 
393POPCRU (note 275 above 
394POPCRU (note 275 above) and Department of Correctional Services (note 289 above). 
395Masondo (note 298) above. 
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employer’s intention to discriminate and must show the disparate impact of the employer’s 
practice on minorities. Once this is established, the employer must show that these relate to the 
successful performance of the job in question. 
 
In view of the cases considered relating to employees requesting for FRL for in-laws who are 
their family in respect of their culture, it is argued that there is no way that an employer or 
legislators can show that restricting the classification of FRL to a nuclear family can relate to the 
successful performance (or inherent requirement) of any job. 
 
In order to succeed in proving cultural discrimination, the employee must show that the 
employer’s enforcement of the policy interfered with the participation in or practice or 
expression of their culture. This was dealt with in the POPCRU decision. An act of 
discrimination which would ordinarily be unfair may be justified through affirmative action or 
the inherent requirements of a job. In the POPCRU decision, the Court found that the employer 
had failed to prove that the policy requiring employees to keep short hair was related to an 
inherent requirement of a job since female employees were allowed to keep long dreadlocks. 
 
A consideration of the issue would be incomplete if further definitions which succeeded the EEA 
were not considered. PEPUDA like the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination and applies to 
employees not covered by the BCEA. It enjoys supremacy over the EEA which means that in 
interpreting discrimination cases in the workplace, it must be taken into account. Family 
responsibility in terms of PEPUDA includes the responsibility to a spouse, partner, dependent, 
child and any other member of the family in respect of whom he is entitled to care and support. 
The definition is not as broad as that offered by the international, regional instruments and the 
1997 White Paper into family. This is probably because of the acknowledgement of the problem 
created by the wide definition in the workplace and an attempt to accommodate the rights 
conferred in the Constitution. None of the decisions in the employment law field considered and 
applied the provisions of PEPUDA in dealing with cases. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in the POPCRU decision dealing with culture considered the 
provisions of both the EEA and of PEPUDA. However this case had nothing to do with FRL. 
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Therefore the different definitions offered in the two statutes was not considered. The Court 
further considered whether the limitation of the right to culture was justifiable and considered in 
full the test applicable in terms of the limitation clause.  
 
Further regard made to the 2011 Green Paper on families acknowledged the different types of 
families in South Africa influenced by various cultures and social context. It recognises diversity 
in the country and the challenges of the changing family structures influenced by colonization 
and apartheid. While the 2012 White Papersought to provide a cleared definition including blood 
relation, marriage (which includes customary marriage), and cohabitation. Clearly apparent from 
this is the fact that it recognises relations through culture. It also recognises that within the wide 
definition of family, exists narrow or smaller groups in the form of nuclear families.  
 
When the rights in the Constitution, the provisions of the EEA, PEPUDA, international and 
regional documents are considered, the classification in the BCEA seem to differentiate and 
exclude members of the African culture. 
 
Courts, in dealing with cases of family leave responsibility, should consider the benefit of 
following a purposive and teleological approach to interpretation.  With regard to the former, the 
purpose of the legislation and Constitution in promoting cultural diversity, protecting equality 
and human dignity should inform the interpretation of each case before it.  With regard to the 
latter, the values in the Constitution, equality, freedom and dignity; as well as the unstated but 
recognised value of ‘ubuntu’396 can also assist courts in interpretation of the legislative 
provisions before it.397Mokgoro J in the seminal judgment of Makwanyane noted the importance 
of value-laden interpretation: 
 
“With the entrenchment of the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a supreme 
Constitution, however, the interpretive task frequently involves making constitutional choices by 
balancing competing fundamental rights and freedoms.  This can often only be done by reference 
to a system of values extraneous to the constitutional text itself, where these principles constitute 
                                                          
396S v Makwanyane1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 198H-I. 
397 See TW Bennett ‘Ubuntu: An African Equity’ (2011) 14(4) PER 30-61 for an overview of the use of ‘ubuntu’ in 
jurisprudence. 
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the historical context in which the text was adopted and which help to explain the meaning of the 
text…The Constitution makes it particularly imperative for courts to develop the entrenched 
fundamental rights in terms of a cohesive set of values, ideal to an open and democratic society.  
To this end common values of human rights protection the world over and foreign precedent may 
be instructive.” 
 
Mokgoro J explained her understanding of ‘ubuntu’ as follows: 
 
“Metaphorically, [ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntungumuntungabantu describing the 
significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central tothe survival of communities. While 
it envelops the key values of groupsolidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to 
basic normsand collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity andmorality. Its 
spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift fromconfrontation to conciliation.”398 
 
The collective unity of humanity is thus recognised.  Langa J further explained the concept of 
‘ubuntu’ as follows: 
 
“It is a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on theinterdependence of the 
members of a community. It recognises a person’sstatus as a human being, entitled to 
unconditional respect, dignity, value andacceptance from the members of the community [that] 
such person happensto be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a 
corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptanceto each member of that 
community. More importantly, it regulates theexercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing 
and co-responsibilityand the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.”399 
 
This recognition of “co-responsibility” is important for a generous conception of ‘family responsibility 
leave’ that includes not just “immediate family” as recognised by our legislation, but the African concept 




                                                          
398 Makwanyane (note 396 above) para 308. 
399Makwanyane (note 396 above) para 224. 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The following conclusions have been drawn from the analysis above: 
 
The definition of the concept family is influenced by culture with the classification of family 
members following the cultural connotation as described by members of the group.  This 
situation is observable in South Africa as a country with diverse cultures.  Although the Western 
culture dominated during the colonial period with the addition of other secular factors such as 
industrialisation, the African culture has resisted the effects and defied all other influences 
imposed on it. Family in the African culture is based on care and support and includes blood and 
non-blood relatives, beyond legal boundaries, provided that care giving and support are 
provided. It is concluded that any exclusion of family members acquired from this care and 
support conduct will be perceived as some form of differentiation. 
 
International instruments, the Constitution and legislative documents protect cultural practices 
and therefore any classification defining cultural behaviour of a group.  Only, the documents do 
not directly classify members of the African group that make up a family. Omission of this 
classification opened the definition of family and the classification of members to different 
interpretations and conclusions.  For example, in one case (Masondo) no guidance could be 
obtained from the documents while in another (Co-operate Workers’ Union) the documents were 
said to be helpful. The situation is confusing, especially of no other guiding document is 
available to accommodate the diverse cultures.  
 
In respect of the classification in the BCEA, some decision makers have applied the 
classification narrowly while others found it necessary to deviate from the classification. This 
and the observation of collective agreements by organised workplaces evidence the challenges 
and problems caused by the classification in its current form. 
 
Definitions of family and family responsibility obtained from the EEA and PEPUDA are 
embracive and inclusive of the blood and non-blood classification of the African culture, except 
that the members of a family are not fully classified.  For example, the EEA refers to the 
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“immediate family”, classification which may be obtained from dictionaries. The EEA’s role is 
to clarify matters of discrimination.  When it falls short of providing the necessary guidance, it 
leaves FRL vulnerable to differentiation and the African culture undermined. 
 
It is concluded that the Western culture influenced law-making in South Africa as far as FRL is 
concerned, raising issues of differentiation. For example, the BCEA definition of family is 
narrow and is inclined to the nuclear-type family, exclusive of the African culture, while the 
classification of members excludes members who would be regarded as part of the family in the 
African culture. With the concept of FRL being relatively new in the country (introduced in 
1997), the BCEA classification has not been helpful and is seen as discriminatory especially to 
some members (care-givers) of the African culture, misleading applications of the FRL. The 
influence comes because the BCEA is an important legislative document to regulate and provide 
working conditions in the workplace. The Jonase case, in which in-laws were excluded as 
members, serves as a typical example. The discriminatory activities are worsened by the 
tendencies of employers to rely on the classification despite the discretion afforded to them. The 
misleading classification also makes it difficult for employees to prove cultural discrimination in 
instances where FRL is denied. 
 
The incommensurability of the nuclear definition and the definition of household in the 
indigenous sense means that conflating ‘family’ with the residents of a household or dwelling is 
not helpful as stated earlier.400Accordingly, the United Kingdom’s Employment Rights Act 
definition of a dependant, including the employee’s spouse/civil partner, child, parent ‘or a 
person who lives in the same household’ will not assist.401  This does not conceive of in-laws, for 
example, that are likely not to live in the same household.  The UK’s definition may, however, 
be helpful in that it also includes: 
 
“any person who reasonably relies on the employee  
a) for assistance on an occasion when the person falls ill or is injured or assaulted, or  
                                                          
400Morphy (note 22 above) 28. 
401 Section 57A(3) of the United Kingdom’s Employment Rights Act 1996.  This section further qualifies members 
of a household by excluding a resident who is an employee, tenant, lodger or boarder. 
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b)  to make arrangements for the provision of care in the event of illness or injury”.402 
 
Further, the reasonable reliance of such dependant also includes “any person who reasonably 
relies on the employee to make arrangements for the provision of care”.403This definition on the 
face of it appears wider than its South African counterpart, but does not include attending the 




The following recommendations are made in this study: 
 
Prohibition of unfair discrimination in workplaces espoused by the EEA and the Constitution has 
to be upheld at all costs. As FRL and culture are among the listed grounds, any discrimination on 
such grounds has to be prohibited. 
 
In order for the grounds to be protected, there is a need for a definition of family and family 
responsibility and classification of members of a family in South Africa that is inclusive of the 
African culture. For the definition(s) to be inclusive and accommodative of the African culture 
both blood and non-blood (care-giving) relatives have to be classified as family members.  The 
definitions will assist in the application of the family responsibility leave. It is recommended that 
the definitions take into account the influence of colonisation, industrialisation and Apartheid on 
the African tradition and to note the level of resistance of the culture within such influence.  
 
                                                          
402Section 57A(4)(a) and (b) of the Employment Rights Act. 
403Section 57A(5) of the Employment Rights Act. 
404The categories of instances in which an employee is permitted to take reasonable time off during working hours 
includes the following in terms of section 57A(1): 
‘(a) to provide assistance on an occasion when a dependant falls ill, gives birth or is injured or 
assaulted, 
(b) to make arrangements for the provision of care for a dependant who is ill or injured, 
(c) in consequence of the death of a dependant, 
(d) because of the unexpected disruption or termination of arrangements for the care of a dependant, 
or 
(e) to deal with an incident which involves a child of the employee and which occurs unexpectedly in 
a period during which an educational establishment which the child attends is responsible for 
him.’ 
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To avoid abuse of a broader definition in the application of FRL, other strategies such as the 
restriction of the number of leave days for family responsibility and the application of the 
provision of section 27 of the BCEA for employers to require proof may be used.  Culturally, 
sincerity and good faith are important elements in the classification, and to assist the employer to 
make informed decisions.  
 
In view of the complexity of the definition of family and to safeguard employers from fear of 
abuse and that of not complying with the law, it is recommended that the provision of section 
27(2) of the BCEA be amended in order to be consistent with ratified international instruments 
more specifically the ILO Convention 156 read with the South African Constitution and other 
legislation.  In particular the amended definition should be in line with both the EEA and most 
importantly, the PEPUDA, which has since the promulgation of the BCEA provided a 
reasonably acceptable definition that is in line with and takes into account the diverse nature of 
the country. This will have an effect of influencing decision makers in unorganised workplaces 
and organised sectors and will have the result of removing the discrimination identified. 
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